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This research is concerned with the Contadora peace 
process initiated by Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and 
Panama, the international and domestic contexts from which 
these four states chose tG collectively mediate peace 
negotiations in Central America. Its primary purpose is to 
explain how and why these four Latin American countries 
chose to pursue a foreign policy which continues to find 
opposition from the Reagan administration. This is in no 
way a comprehensive explanation of the collectivity. My 
research has been limited by the publication lag in United 
Nations documents, the dearth of analytical literature in 
the study of Latin Am~rican foreign policies, and the 
non-existence of indexes for Latin American newspapers. I 
have tried to seek -out more literature than is available 
through the OSU Edmond Low Library. To this end, I spent 
five days in the libarary of the University of Texas at 
Austin's Institute of Latin American Studies. 
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thesis. His encouragement and concern was noted and very 
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CHAPTER I 
WHY THE CONTADORA GROUP? 
Differing Perspectives 
Opposition to U.S. foreign policy in Central America 
crystallized January 8-9, 1983, with the formation of the 
Contadora Group. The foreign ministers of Panama, Colombia, 
Venezuela, and Mexico met on the Panamanian island of 
Contadora on that date to discuss how to achieve peace in 
Central America. The Contadora Group has consistently 
rejected United States' policy as improperly imposing a Cold 
1 War view on the region's problems. The United States, in 
turn, has not given full support to the Contadora Group's 
efforts, and has even blocked one Contadora peace treaty. 2 
This research examines the Contadora peace process which 
ostensibly seeks a negotiated, peaceful settlement of the 
Central American conflict through the collective action of 
the four Contadora member nations. 
The Carter and Reagan administrations have applied a 
Cold War analysis to Central America, viewing conflicts 
there as part of a Soviet-Cuban plan to spread Marxism 
throughout the region. The Reagan Administration has 
invoked the cliched "domino theory," which posits that 
1 
Central American governments will fall to communism like so 
many dominoes, leading finally to a communist Mexico. 3 
Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, ideologue of President Reagan's 
Central American policy and former ambassador to the United 
Nations, attributes the fall of Anastasio Somoza's regime 
primarily to what she terms Jimmy Carter's "inept" Latin 
American policy. 4 She takes no account of deep-seated 
economic, political, and social inequalities which critics 
of the administration's policy, including the Contadora 
Group, define as the cause of unrest in the region. One 
Mexican critic assesses the Reagan administration's 
position: 
••• Washington views events in Central 
America in terms of a global confrontation with 
the USSR. This point of view, elaborated in a 
white paper on El Salvador, fears outside 
communist involvement. The document concludes 
that the insurrection in that country "has been 
progressively transformed into a textbook case of 
indirect arme~ aggression by Communist powers 
through Cuba. 
The Reagan administration has committed itself to a 
military strategy in Central America which is supported by 
few Latin American countries. The U.S. has established a 
base in Honduras near the border with Nicaragua, and has 
conducted a number of military exercises there. 6 One 
military exercise in the Caribbean involved 30,000 troops 
from all branches in the U.S. armed services. 7 The 
'2 
Central Intelligence Agency has organized and funded an army 
of Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, or contras, also in 
~3 
Honduras. The CIA is also responsible for the mining of 
Nicaraguan ports, which has drawn fire from Congress and the 
international community. 8 In El Salvador, the U.S. has 
provided millions of dollars in economic and military aid to 
a government whose legitimacy and control of the military is 
in question. U.S. assistance includes arms, ammunition, 
logistical support, and advisors who have helped train more 
than 15,000 Salvadoran soldiers. 9 These policies have 
faced considerable domestic opposition, from both the 
C d h bl . 10 ongress, an t e pu Lc. 
The Contadora Group's opposition to U.S. policy in 
Central America raises a number of questions about 
inter-American relations. It may be reasoned that the 
Contadora Group's existence and its policies are due, in 
part, to reaction to past and present U.S. policy in Latin 
America. It is of particular importance that the Latin 
American perception of present U.S. policy is influenced by 
a resentment of the 150 year history of U.S. interventions 
in the hemisphere. Recent interventions include the 
CIA-organized overthrow of Guatemala's democratically 
elected President Arbenz in 1954, the occupation by U.S. 
Marines of the Dominican Republic in 1965 to prevent a 
Communist victory in that country, the CIA-backed coup 
d'etat which overthrew Chile's elected President Allende, 
and the 1983 invasion of Grenada. Of the four Contadora 
countries, only Venezuela has escaped direct armed 
intervention by the United States. This history, combined 
with present U.S. policy, fuels fears of a direct U.S. 
military intervention in Central America. 
Such a long history of United States' interventions in 
Latin American countries may explain why nations in the 
region are particularly resentful of U.S. dominance. But 
why have the four Contadora Group countries chosen the 
present to challenge U.S. policy in Central America? And 
through what means are these countries presenting this 
challenge? 
The International System in Transition 
One explanation is that the international sytem has 
undergone changes such that U.S. hegemony in the Western 
Hemisphere has waned in recent years, thereby creating new 
opportunities for other states in the hemisphere. 11 
Political theorist Morton Kaplan, and others, have theorized 
that in the period immediately following World War II, the 
world fit the model of a loose bipolar system. Kaplan's 
loose bipolar model posits two major rival nations, or 
superpowers, leading directly competing blocs, and 
uncommitted neutral national actors. 12 Ideology aside, 
the superpowers are assumed to gain long-term allies when 
the foreign policy-makers of weaker states discern that 
their own countries' security would be best protected in 
alliance with one of the bloc leaders, and perhaps when they 
find themselves coerced into membership in one of the 
blocs. 13 
Latin America has been an official member of the 
Western alliance since the signing of the 1947 Rio 
Treaty. 14 However, Latin American states' decisions to 
join the United States to form the Inter-American system 
after World War II was not due to coercion, nor out of fear 
of the Soviet bloc. The Latin American nations were 
reluctant to enter into a treaty of collective security 
after World War II, but were induced to join by promises of 
economic "cooperation", or assistance, from Washington, and 
the opportunity to formalize the United States' denunciation 
of intervention in Latin American states in the Rio Treaty 
and the Charter of the Organization of American States. 15 
Some scholars of the international system suggest that 
Kaplan's loose bipolar model no longer accurately describes 
the international system. 16 They assert that the 
loose-bipolar system of the post-World War II era has 
undergone transformation such that Washington and Moscow do 
not wield power over their respective allies as they did 
immediately following World War II. 17 Both the Soviet and 
Western blocs have experienced internal conflicts and a loss 
of solidarity since the 1950's. 18 The term "polycentrism" 
was coined by Soviet writers in the 1950's to describe the 
breakup of the monolithic communist bloc. 19 The term has 
also been applied to the decentralization of the Western 
5 
bloc after the recovery of Europe and the increasing 
national diversity in foreign policies in the international 
system. 
Power is more diffuse in the contemporary world than a 
loose bipolar model allows for. Steven Rosen writes that in 
the 1950's the American bloc began to crack: 
Latin America, increasingly disenchanted with 
Washington's sporadic paternalism, began to 
consider itself a member of the Third World, 
despite its forma1 25ilitary and economic ties with 
the United States. 
Furthermore, Alfred Stepan writes that these formal military 
and economic ties with the U.S. have been and are 
disappearing. He writes that the United States is no longer 
the primary supplier of arms to Latin America, lagging 
behind Europe and Isreal, and challenged by Argentine and 
B "1" . d . 21 raz1 1an export arms 1n ustr1es. Bilateral economic 
relations have also changed. Until the mid-1960's, the 
United States Agency for International Development provided 
monies which significantly increased the trade capacities of 
many Latin American countries. "Middle income" countries, 
such as Mexico and Venezuela, no longer qualify for USAID 
programs, while structural economic changes within those 
countries' economies have improved their standing in the 
22 global economy. 
Many Latin American states have asserted new and 
independent foreign policies since the advent of a more 
polycentric system. The meaning of an independent foreign 
6 
policy is that in relation to the United States, 
particularly on Cold War issues, each of the Latin American 
countries has "asserted policy positions according to 
individual country interests and requirements of national 
security." 23 These nations have "frequently opposed U.S. 
Cold War policies because their own sovereignties are 
threatened when the principle of non-intervention is 
24 
endangered." Many Latin American and other third world 
nations have sought to decrease their dependence on the U.S. 
through diversifying trade and investment away from the 
United States. 25 According to Robert Rothstein, states 
asserting themselves politically in these ways suggest a 
multipolar or polycentric distribution of power, in that 
alliances have become more flexible than allowed under the 
loose bipolar mode1. 26 
While the world may be in transition from a loose 
bipolar model toward a polycentric one, this does not, in 
the opinion of the writer, indicate a return to a classical 
balance of power system. The classical balance of power 
system contains a minimum of five large powers of roughly 
equal importance which operate in a flexible alliance system 
in which there is a nation that play the role of "balancer" 
by throwing its weight to the weaker of two alliances, 
thereby discouraging the previously dominant alliance from 
f . 27 acts o agress1on. Wolfram Hanrieder writes that the 
period of bipolarity experienced by the world after 1945 is 
7 
evolving into a more flexible international system, which 
28 exhibits both bipolar and polycentric patterns. The 
world is still dominated by the competition between the 
superpowers, and there is no agent, national or 
supranational, that can act as balancer between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the four Contadora 
members are still economically dependent on the major leader 
of the Western bloc: the United States. 29 
Polycentrism at the Regional Level 
Perhaps the best illustration of transition to a 
polycentric system of international relations is found in 
formerly quiescent Latin American nations asserting an 
independent foreign policy from that of the United States. 
Twenty-five years ago the United States knew near-solid 
hemispheric support for its policy toward Castro's regime. 
Within four years after the Cuban revolution, all Latin 
America, except Mexico, had followed the United States' lead 
and had turned its collective back on Cuba. In direct 
violation of the Charter of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), Cuba was expelled from that body. 30 A 
variety of sanctions were applied by the OAS to Cuba in 1964 
and 1967, which were not lifted until 1975. Cuba's 
continued socialist revolutionary experiment, in alliance 
with the Soviet Union, is evidence that United States' 
dominance of the Western Hemisphere is less than it used to 
8 
be. 
This contrasts with the challenges from longstanding 
allies facing the United States' Central American policy 
today. In 1979, the Carter Administration could not get 
enough votes in the OAS for its proposal to send a 
multinational peacekeeping force to Nicaragua; this U.S. 
plan was designed to support 'moderate' elements in 
Nicaragua, thereby preventing a victory by the National 
Sandinista Liberation Front, or FSLN. In 1985, six years 
after the Nicaraguan revolution, the Reagan Administration 
alone imposes a trade embargo against the Sandinista regime. 
Not only do Japan, Western Europe and a number of Latin 
American countries trade with Nicaragua, but these nations 
also supply the Sandinistas with economic and military 
assistance which is unavailable from the u.s. 31 
From the preceding, one may hypothesize that the 
Contadora process is a reflection of a transition toward a 
polycentric world. This thesis will test the extent to 
which the Contadora Group is a manifestation of a movement 
away from a loose-bipolar system toward a polycentric one. 
It will examine the Contadora Group as a case study of 
decreased United States' hegemony in the Western hemisphere. 
This thesis will attempt to show whether the decisions of 
Panamanian, Colombian, Mexican, and Venezuelan foreign 
policy-makers to participate in the Contadora Group are 
linked to a transition in the international system. 
9 
The Emergence of 
Independent Foreign Policies 
10 
Another explanation for the emergence of the Contadora 
Group and the commitment of its four member countries to it, 
is the role of individual foreign policies designed to 
protect and pursue the national interests or goals of a 
given country. The concept of foreign policy refers to the 
objectives which a nation's policy-makers seek to achieve 
abroad, the values that shape those goals, and the means 
through which those objectives are pursued. 32 Foreign 
policy objectives are determined by a nation's foreign 
policy-makers in terms of what they perceive to be in the 
national interest. Their ultimate goal is to promote those 
interests in the minds of others. 33 Foreign policy-makers 
develop a hierarchy of interests, according to their 
perception of them, which may be termed core, medium-range, 
and long-term interests. "Certain interests must be 
defended at all costs; others should be safeguarded under 
particular circumstances; and certain others, although 
desirable, can almost never be defended.'~4 Typically, 
foreign policy goals asserted by states focus first on 
self-preservation, and later, on self-enhancement, which may 
include the goal of acquiring power, and the demonstration 
f h h 1 . f t. 35 Th" h o power t roug a po ~cy o pres ~ge. ~s researc 
contends that the Contadora countries are motivated by two 
levels of goals: that of an altruistic and practical goal 
of regional peace, and of self-enhancement, or pursuit of 
prestige and/or power. The core interest is to protect 
their sovereignty. It is motivated by fear of a U.S. 
infringement on their sovreignty should a regional war 
develop. The pursuit of prestige and/or power is a 
middle-range interest. This research will attempt to 
determine how successful each member of the Contadora Group 
is in meeting it foreign policy objectives. 
-11 
A multitude of external and internal determinants shape 
the decisions foreign policy-makers make. As discussed 
earlier, a change in the international system will at least 
partially determine a country's foreign policy. While the 
international system is in transition some states may find 
available to them previously unavailable policies. Insofar 
as change in the international system affects relationships 
among nations, it serves as an external determinant of their 
individual foreign policy processes. Latin American nations 
dominated by the U.S. have chosen goals from their hierarchy 
of foreign policy objectives which express more depth and 
range than seen previously in the hemisphere. 
The study of Latin American foreign policies is in its 
infancy. Before 1970, such study in the United States 
"usually referred to U.S. foreign policy toward Latin 
America rather than to foreign policies of Latin American 
nations individually or collectively toward any other 
nation. 36 However, researchers have begun to fill in the 
gap in Latin American foreign policy studies. A number of 
studies of the foreign policies of Latin American states' 
have emerged in recent years. The author utilized a 
12 
collection of such articles in Latin American Foreign 
Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions edited by Elizabeth 
G. Ferris and Jennie K. Lincoln. Insofar as this thesis 
includes a look at the U.S. role in Central America, several 
classic studies of U.S.-Latin American relations have been 
utilized. They include A Survey of United States -Latin 
American Relations by J. Lloyd Mecham, and The Latin 
American Policy of the United States by Samuel F. Bemis, 
which traces and interprets U.S. policy toward Latin America 
from independence through World War II. Until recently, 
studies of Latin American foreign policy have primarily 
consisted of case studies of the foreign policies of 
individual nations, with strong emphasis on the analysis of 
external and internal determinants of foreign policy, the 
substantive content of individual foreign policies, and the 
subsequent consequences of a foreign policy. The literature 
on Latin American foreign policies concerning the process by 
which policies are made and implemented is very weak. 37 
"To some extent this emphasis accurately reflects the 
predominance of the chief executive in the foreign 
policy-making process."38 To this extent, it would be 
inappropriate to extrapolate a model based on what has been 
.13 
written about the U.S. foreign policy-making process, as 
political institutions behave very differently in most Latin 
American countries. 
Therefore, the author has relied heavily on studies 
which examine the content of the foreign policies of each of 
the Contadora members. The most plentiful literature is on 
Mexico. Several studies of Mexican foreign policies were 
helpful in researching this thesis. These include several 
journal articles by Bruce M. Bagley which deal with Mexico 
as a regional power, two articles by Edward J. Williams and 
one by John F. McShane which focus on Mexico's Central 
American policy, and the motivations for that policy, and an 
article by James F. Engel that analyzes the role of the 
Mexican Revolution in shaping the country's foreign policy. 
Studies of Venezuelan foreign policy useful to the author 
include a paper by Douglas Carlisle entitled ''Venezuelan 
Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Beginning," Robert 
Bond's book, Contemporary Venezuela and its Role in 
International Affairs, and an article by Demetrio Boersner 
which discusses Venezuelan policies toward Central America. 
The impact of increased oil revenues on Venezuela's foreign 
policy discussed in an article by David Blank. Few works 
illuminate Colombian foreign policy; those which were 
available were several articles by Gerhard Drekonja-Kornat, 
an article by Ramon Jimeno dealing with Colombian policy in 
the Caribbean, and several analyses of Colombian-U.S. 
1.4 
relations. Panamanian foreign policy literature is even 
more scarce, so the author relied on more traditional 
studies of U.S.-Panamanian relations, and a chapter of a 
book by Steven C. Ropp which examines the changes in 
Panamanian politics since 1903. In addition to the 
literature referred to above, the author has utilized 
English-language periodicals which review Latin American and 
Central American news, and Latin American newspapers for 
indications of shifts in foreign policy. 
The author utilized U.S. and Latin American periodicals 
and newspapers, and United Nations documents for material 
concerning the Contadora Group's proposals and problems. 
Some of these sources discuss the U.S. role in the Contadora 
process; however, no one has analyzed the reasons why the 
four Contadora members are pursuing this policy. This 
thesis provides the first analysis of the motivations for 
the member states of the Contadora Group, and the first 
attempt to compare the foreign policy motivations of the 
four particular countries which make up the Contadora 
Group. 
This thesis will examine the question of how and why 
"small powers" are able to develop a leadership position in 
a region dominated by a "large power". In more concrete 
terms, this research shall examine the Contadora Group 
member countries' foreign policies, and examine their 
efforts toward a Contadora Peace treaty in Central America 
15 
in opposition to U.S. Central American policy. In treating 
the foreign policies of the Contadora members, this thesis 
will examine the Contadora process as a manifestation of the 
trend for Latin American states to assert their national 
interest, according to what their foreign policy-makers 
perceive as the national interest, in opposition to United 
States policy. This thesis will search for the foreign 
policy goals common to the four nations, and will also 
attempt to illuminate differences in their foreign policy 
priorities. Reflecting the dominant role of the Latin 
American presidency in foreign policy-making, it will 
include a look for differences in the style of individual 
presidents within the Contadora Group states. Further, this 
research will examine how successful the Contadora Group has 
been in attaining both its stated goals for achieving 
regional peace, and the inferred goals of enhancing their 
individual power and prestige. 
Chapter Two will consist of case studies of the four 
Contadora Group member states: Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, 
and Mexico, and their foreign policy motivations behind 
their participation in the Contadora Group. This will 
entail an examination of the content of individual foreign 
policies, and the external and internal foreign policy 
determinants behind the pursuit of the Contadora process. 
Chapter Three will look beyond the formulation, 
implementation, and evaluation of foreign policy choices 
16 
within the four Contadora member countries. This chapter 
will look to the larger interactive process of relations 
between the Contadora Group, the United States, and other 
international actors. Proposals and recommendations of the 
Contadora Group, as well as obstacles to the peace process, 
will be explored in Chapter Three. This assessment of the 
Contadora process will include discussion of various 
obstacles faced by the Contadora Group, including U.S. 
foreign policy in the region, and vis-a-vis the Contadora 
Group. This chapter will also assess where Contadora is 
going, and will evaluate current efforts of the Contadora 
Group and its chances for obtaining a regional peace 
treaty. 
Chapter Four will consist of a summary of conclusions 
made in the course of answering the question of how and why 
have the four Contadora.Group member nations been able, as 
"small powers", to develop a leadership position in the 
Western hemisphere, a region dominated by the United States. 
Moreover, this chapter will evaluate the success of the 
Contadora Group in achieving the goal of Central American 
peace in the face of U.S. opposition. This last chapter 
will summarize the relative success of the four Contadora 
member countries in achieving their foreign policy goals 
through participation in the Contadora Group. 
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CHAPTER II 
FOREIGN POLICIES: CASE STUDIES 
OF THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES 
It was suggested in Chapter One that a possible 
explanation for the activity of the Contadora Group is the 
role of foreign policy in promoting the national interest as 
defined by foreign policymakers of the four Contadora member 
states. This chpater will explain the Contadora Group in 
terms of possible external and internal foreign policy 
motivations. In an effort to determine the various motiv-
ations of Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico for 
participating in the Contadora process, this chapter will 
consist of case studies of the foreign policies of the 
Contadora countries. 
This chapter will look for differences and common 
themes in the content and style of foreign policies, and of 
perception of the international system and their nations' 
roles in it. 
Panama: A Shift in Foreign Policy? 
Panama's dependence on the U.S. has been heavy since 
it achieved its independence from Colombia in 1903. 
Panama's independence was won with the indispensible 
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assistance of the United States, but was compromised almost 
immediately in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903 which 
gave the U.S. the right of armed intervention in Panama, and 
the right to any territory essential to the maintenance or 
security of the Canal. 1 Further, the Panamanian 
Constitution of 1904 stipulated that defense of the canal 
and of Panama's continued independence and sovereignty was 
the obligation of the United States; this document also 
confirmed the U.S. right of intervention in Panama. 2 
Until the 1978 Canal Treaty, Panama's foreign policy 
consisted mainly of its bilateral relationship with the 
United States. Many Panamanians believe the U.S. played an 
imperialistic role in their country. This had an impact on 
domestic politics, as "a candidate's legitimacy derived 
largely from foreign policy positions adopted in relation to 
the 'Colossus of the North' ."3 Evidence that Panamanian 
dependence on the U.S. has been extremely heavy follows: 
A large troop presence was normally 
maintained in the Canal Zone, and the Panamanian 
economy was dominated by the Canal Zone and by the 
banana plantations of United Fruit. Indeed the 
economic dependence of Panama on the United States 
was so great during most of the twentieth century 
that this factor alone could have easily inhibited 
the pursuit ~f independent foreign policy 
initiatives. 
Toward an Independent Foreign Policy 
General Omar Torrijos dominated Panamanian politics 
until his death in a plane crash July 31, 1981. Torrijos 
came to power in 1968 through a coup d'etat which removed 
the newly elected Arnulfo Arias Madrid from office. AS 
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Supreme Commander fo the National Guard, Torrijos created 
the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), consisting of 
popular forces such as the poor, students, and labor groups, 
which he aligned with the National Guard against the 
oligarchy. 5 The Panamanian consititution explicitly 
recognizes the political role of the military, which is 
known as the Defense Forces, and formerly as the National 
Guard. The president does not command the military and 
cannot appoint, nor remove, officers. 6 
Since Torrijos' death, the military has maintained 
control of Panama's politics. From Torrijos' death until 
the May 1984 presidential elections, Brig. Gen. Manuel A. 
Noriega, chief of the Defense Forces, has forced two 
presidents to resign over differences over foreign policy 
and PRD politics, and has selected two other presidents. 
Noriega endorsed the U.S. sponsored regional military 
alliance against Nicaragua, CONDECA, which is inconsistent 
with former-President Ricardo de la Espriella's 
participation in Contadora. De la Espriella resigned 
January 13, 1984, after Noriega forced the nomination of PRD 
outsider Nicolas Ardito Barletta as the party's candidate 
for the May 1984 presidential election. 7 Ardito won the 
election, and was inaugurated in December of 1984. 
From 1968 to 1978, Panama's primary foreign policy 
goal was a new Canal treaty with the United States. In 
order to pressure the U.S. into negotiating the new Panama 
Canal treaties with the United States, Torrijos built a 
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heterogenous international coalition, which included Havana, 
Tel Aviv, and others. 8 Torrijos forged an independent and 
anti-imperialistic reputation for Panama, which earned the 
country ideological legitimacy with the non-aligned 
movement. Torrijos "led Panama to a position of regional 
and even world influence far out of proportion to the size 
of the country." 9 
With the ratification of a new treaty in 1978, 
Panama's primary foreign policyc goal shifted to protection 
from a perceived threat of U.S. intervention under the 1978 
Neutrality Treaty. 10 The U.S. was granted in the 1978 
treaty "a permanent, unilateral right to intervene in Panama 
on behalf of the Canal's so-called neutrality." 11 Steven 
Ropp writes that Panama began to develop broad relations 
with sympathetic Third World nations to get their signatures 
on the Neutrality Treaty in an effort to demonstrate to the 
U.S. the neutrality of the canal does not require U.S. 
"protection." This also enhanced Panama's prestige and 
autonomy. 
Editorials and articles in Panamanian newsmagazines 
suggest that many Panamanians remain fearful of a unilateral 
intervention by the United States. This perception is that 
overt U.S. military activity in any of the Central American 
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countries would heighten the possibility that the Canal Zone 
would be the scene of another U.S. military occupation. 
Such an intrusion would threten Panama's sovereignty, and 
would damage the image of independence that Panama's leaders 
have struggled to build. Charges that Panama is no more 
than a protectorate of the United States would again ring 
with some truth to them. That, the majority of Panamanians 
do not want. A primary motivation for Panama to join the 
Contadora Group, then, could be fears of U.S. "interests" in 
the canal. 
This prospect has prompted Panama to join a multi-
lateral effort to prevent the escalation of conflict in 
Central America. Regular interaction with the regional 
powers of Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, serve to enhance 
Panama's image. Anything which appears to, or actually 
does, lessen Panama's dependence on the u.s., without 
compromising Panama in the eyes of its leaders, is seen to 
be in Panama's national interest. Panama does not desire to 
return to such a weak position in its assymetrical bilateral 
relationship with the U.S. as it has endured in the past. 
With a long history of U.S. domination of Panama, the 
country is still sensitive to anything which might undermine 
its relatively new image as an independent member of the 
non-aligned movement. An example of this sensitivity is the 
Panamanian protest of the use of AWACS (Airborne Warning and 
Control System) aircraft operating out of U.S. Howard Air 
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Force Base, located in the Canal Zone. The Pentagon 
confirmed the AWACS were used in reconaissance missions over 
Central America to watch out for small planes smuggling 
weapons out of Nicaragua. Panama's government said this 
would "undermine Panama's standing among its Latin American 
neighbors and provide fuel for the Panamanian left." 12 
Panama's foreign policy motivations are not limited to 
decreasing its dependence on the United States. In the 
1930's, Panama broke relations with Franco's Spain. 13 
More recently, Panama supported the Sandinistas in their 
revolt against Somoza. The late Omar Torrijos did not like 
the Nicaraguan dictator, which probably motivated him in 
part to support the Sandinistas. Torrijos funnelled armes 
to the FSLN, and formed a semi- clandestine military unit 
which was sent to aid the Nicaraguan revolutionaries. When 
Somoza fell from power in July 1979, over 200 Panamanian 
volunteers were fighting in Nicaragua, accompanied by an 
undetermined number of "retired" Panamanian National 
Guards. 14 
At the OAS conference of June 1979, which took place 
one month before Somoza's defeat, Panama voted against the 
U.S. proposal to send a multinational peacekeeping force to 
Nicaragua. After the Sandinista victory, Panama continued 
to provide them with assistance. The Panamanian National 
Guard helped train and equip the new police force of 
Nicaragua; the old police force, which was the infamous 
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Somocista National Guard, had fled the country as it was as 
much a target of the revolution as Somoza himself. 15 
Thus, it is clear that Panama's foreign policy has been 
motivated by other factors than its bilateral relationship 
with the United States. 
Continued Dependence on the United States 
Panama remains heavily dependent on foreign 
investment, primarily on that from the U.S. In 1981, U.S. 
investment accounted for over half of all foreign investment 
in Panama. Panama is attempting to diversify its dependence 
on foreign capital, and has focused on attracting Japanese, 
Hong Kong, and Tawainese investment. Panama signed 
agreements in 1983 which encouraged British, French, and 
U.S. investment. 16 "Until the economy [of Panama] is less 
dependent on foreign investment and is more diversified, its 
future will hinge on a peaceful and stable business 
environment."17 War in the region would threaten 
Panmanian attempts at diversification. It can be assumed 
that Panama's leaders hope to avoid that. 
The United States Agency for International Development 
(AID) has loaned Panama $25 million for 1985. This money to 
be used to improve the living standards of low-income 
Panamanians. In 1984, AID donated $30 million to help 
stabilize Panama'S economy. 18 The investment agreement 
with the United States illustrates Panama's recognition that 
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it cannot break ties with the U.S. without hurting its own 
economy (or risking a U.S. intervention in the Canal Zone). 
The U.S. also promised Panama greater economic benefits from 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the establishment of 
U.S. textile mills in Panama. 19 
Concurrent with strengthened economic ties with the 
United States, it is alleged that President Ardito has shown 
signs of supporting the Reagan administration's Central 
American policy. Ardito told the French daily Le Monde that 
"the peoples and governments of Central America would never 
tolerate the presence of Soviet Migs in Nicaragua." 20 In 
late December of 1984, President Ardito and his foreign 
minister attended a conference in Miami which dealt with 
U.S. relations with Latin America and was sponsored by the 
U.S. Congress. Also attending the conference was former 
director of the CIA, William Colby. 21 
Although Panama protested the 1983 U.S.-Honduran "Big 
Pine" military maneuvers, Panama has continued to 
participate in joint military maneuvers with the U.S. in 
1983, 1984, and 1985. Panama's newly elected President 
Ardito agreed to joint military exercises with over 10,000 
U.S. soldiers in Panamanian territory far from the Canal 
Zone, from mid-January to mid-April, 1985. This is eight 
times the number of U.S. troops involved in joint maneuvers 
with Honduras. 22 The joint exercises have been protested 
by Panamanians as a challenge to Panama's sovereignty, in 
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part, because the maneuvers began on the twenty-first 
anniversary of 1964 riots in which 28 young Panamanians were 
killed by U.S. Marines. Those riots were sparked by the 
actions of U.S. authorities who had prevented a Panamanian 
high school student from placing a Panamanian flag in the 
Canal Zone. 23 Panama broke off diplomatic relations with 
the United States following the 1964 riots in the first open 
protest by Panama's government against the u.s. 24 
The 1985 demonstrations denounced the joint maneuvers 
as part of the Reagan administration's military strategy in 
the region. 25 Panama's armed forces have reassured the 
country "that the maneuvers lack any agressive intent 
against other Central American countries."26 The 
protesters also questioned the legality of the military 
exercises. The armed forces have justified them by citing 
the 1977 Torrijos-Carter Canal Treaty which stipulates U.S. 
protection and defense of the Canal Zone until 2000. 
Defense Forces spokesman, Major Edgardo Lopez, said the 
exercises are not military maneuvers, but are training 
exercises for the Canal's defense. However, opponents 
insist that the treaty limits the U.S. presence to the Canal 
Zone itself, whereas the joint exercises took place in a 
jungle area far from the cana1. 27 
Opponents of the military exercises also pointed out 
that the maneuvers could endanger Panama's role in the 
Contadora Group. A revised Contadora draft treaty would 
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prohibit "international military maneuvers" in any signatory 
country, and the suspension within 30 days of maneuvers 
already in progress. Although it is riot clear whether 
Panama would be required to abide by this prohibition, "the 
new exercises ••• could undermine Panama's moral authority in 
h . l . . . . n28 t e reg1ona peace 1n1t1at1ve. 
The government has been controlled by the military 
since 1968. Violence next door is seen by some in the 
Defense Forces as contagious. Should the U.S. intervene in 
the Canal Zone, Panamanians might well blame the military 
and force them to withdraw from politics. It has been 
observed that "the [Panamanian] military does not want to 
1 • · h · t 1· · 1 " 29 re 1nqu1s 1 s po 1t1ca power. 
Summary 
Panama has participated in the Contadora Group, in 
part, to prevent a war in the region which would threaten 
Panama's own autonomy, and the Sandinista government which 
Panama has supported even before it ousted Somoza. Panama 
has sought to prevent the Central American crisis from 
becoming a pretense for a U.S. intervention in the Canal 
Zone. The current of violence in the region also threatens 
to destabilize Panama's own political and economic systems. 
It is in the interest of Panama for the unrest in the region 
to be brought to a peaceful close. These goals are 
motivated by the core foreign policy interest of 
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self-preservation. 
Panama has also pursued a policy of self-enhancement: 
by pursuing an independent foreign policy, Panama has 
enhanced its prestige in the international community. This 
foreign policy interest is rooted in the efforts of Omar 
Torrijos to negotiate a new canal treaty with the United 
States. This theme was continued with Torrijos' support of 
the Sandinistas in the war against the.Somoza regime, and 
continued assistance to the FSLN after its 1979 victory, and 
participation in the Contadora Group. Information was not 
available which would indicate whether Panamanian aid to 
Nicaragua continues. 
However, it appears that President Ardito's commitment 
to the Contadora process is in doubt. Ardito was 
hand-picked by the commander of Panama's defense forces, 
Brig. Gen Noriega, as the presidential candidate of the 
Torrista PRD party. In 1983 Noriega endorsed instruments of 
U.S. policy in Central America which was inconsistent with 
the participation of President de la Espriella in the 
Contadora Group, who later resigned over differences with 
Noriega. One can speculate that as Noriega's choice for the 
presidency, Ardito will fall in line with the General on 
matters of foreign policy. Ardito has permitted five-month 
joint military exercises with the United States to take 
place in Panama, despite protests that they are illegal, are 
threats to Panama's sovereignty, and are threats to the 
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Contadora process. Panama has been closely identified with 
the United States in the past, and is today courting U.S. 
economic aid. Perhaps the price for such favors is a less 
independent foreign policy. 
Venezuela: OPEC Wealth and 
Foreign Policy Activism 
With the exception of three years in the 1940's, 
Venezuela's foreign policy differed little from Washington's 
until the 1970's. Before 1958, Venezuela's presidents 
gained office largely through undemocratic means, and were 
at least partially dependent on the U.S. to remain in 
office. In addition, Venzuela was, and is, dependent on the 
U.S. as the primary market for Venezuelan oil. 
The roots of an independent Venezuelan foreign policy 
appeared under the leadership of Romulo Betancourt, head of 
the revolutionary junta that ruled Venezuela from 1945 to 
1948. This policy emphasized support for democratic 
regimes, and opposition to military and right-wing 
dictatorships through non-recognition of governments ruled 
by dictators. Under Betancourt, Venezuela withdrew 
diplomatic recognition from right-wing dictatorships in 
Nicaragua and Santo Domingo, and the Franco regime in Spain. 
Venezuela also supported the Spanish Republican government-
. . 1 30 1.n-ex1. e. This policy later became known as the 
Betancourt Doctrine during Betancourt's 1958-1964 
.d 31 pres1. ency. 
During rule by the Democratic Action party (AD) from 
1958 to 1968, defense of democracy in Latin .merica was 
Venezuela's foreign policy priority. "By encouraging 
democracy and discouraging dictatorship abroad, Venezuela 
hoped to strengthen its own democratic system."32 During 
the 1950s, Venezuela had established a policy of opposing 
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international communism through support of U.S. policy. In 
the 1960s, Venezuela's AD leadership applied the Betancourt 
Doctrine to Fidel Castro's Cuba, and was thus in line with 
U S f . 1. 33 
. . ore1.gn po 1.cy. 
However, anti-U.S. sentiments grew in Venezuela during 
this same period. Venezuelans were angry with the U.S. for 
its support of the military dictatorship of Perez Jimenez 
through the 1950's. Venezuelans also perceived United 
States' foreign economic policies as responsible for 
Venezuelan dependence on an unstable world market. This 
foreshadowed the position of the Southern coalition in the 
North-South dialogue in which primary points of contention 
are the unfavorable terms of trade on which members of the 
"underdeveloped" world rely, and the drastic fluctuations 
which prices for Southern goods are subject. Beginning in 
the 1960s, Venezuelan foreign policy sought more equal 
political and economic relations with the U.S. 
When the Christian Democrats (Copei) elected their 
first president, Rafael Caldera, in 1968, Venezuela's 
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democratic system had survived a challenge from 
Cuban-supplied communist guerrillas. The leftist guerrilla 
movements had all but dispappeared by 1968. 34 Through 
offers of amnesty, Caldera enticed the Left to voluntarily 
reintegrate itself into Venezuela's social and political 
system. 35 Therefore, Venezuela no longer seemed 
vulnerable to the changing political winds of the 
hemisphere. The world had also changed; it was no longer 
strictly bipolar as evidenced by the emergence of the 
nonaligned countries. For these reasons, Caldera discarded 
the Betancourt Doctrine and appeared to abandon a strong 
36 East-West orientation for a North-South one. Reflecting 
the deemphasis on the Cold War, Venezuela renewed relations 
with the Soviet Union in 1970, and reestablished diplomatic 
relations with Cuba in 1974 during the presidency of Carlos 
Andres Perez. 
With the 1973 energy crisis, both Venezuela's prestige 
and oil revenues grew. Venezuela rode that tide to greater 
autonomy and influence in its international relations. 
During the 1970's, Venezuela became a major player in the 
Caribbean and Central America. 
Emboldened by the U.S. energy cr1s1s and 
conscious of their new power, Venezuelan leaders 
denounced the old economic relationship with the 
United States, nationalized U.S. oil and steel 
holdings, and fashioned a foreign policy different 
from Washington's. For the first time in the 
Twentieth Century, the United States was u~'ble to 
control or channel Venezuelan nationalism. 
In 1974, Venezuela's new oil wealth tripled the 
nation's income over what it had been the previous year. 
This enabled venezuela to begin a policy of direct and 
substantial aid to Central American and Caribbean 
t . 38 coun r1es. Venezuela spent 12% of its Gross Domestic 
Product on foreign aid and was "among the world's most 
generous dispensers of aid.'' 39 President Perez saw the 
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region as a potential market for Venezuelan goods. He hoped 
to integrate Central America and the Caribbean's economic 
potential with Venezuela's, and said that the region's 
countries were the "'natural' recipients of Venezuela's 
marketable exports and of its political influence." 40 
Venezuela also took a strong stand of support for Panama's 
campaign for a new canal treaty. 
Such activism in the region brought charges of 
imperialism against Venezuela. A Dominican Republic 
economist noted this when he said: 
Nineteen-seventy-four probably represents the 
close of period that began in 1961 of great 
dependence of our country on the United States, 
and unfortunately the beginning of another period 
of economic dependence ~~ Venezuela and other 
nearby [oil] producers. 
Venezuela continues to assert itself in the politics 
and economics of Central America in order to increase its 
own prestige as a regional power. 42 However, with the 
bust in the oil market in the early 1980s, Venezuela's oil 
. d . f . 1" t• . d 1" d 43 rece1pts an 1ts ore1gn po 1cy ac 1v1sm ec 1ne • In 
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spite of this, "there is no question that it has permanently 
extended its influence in the area." 44 Venezuela 
continues to use its oil to enhance its image through the 
1980 San Jos~ Protocol, also known as the Mexican-Venezuelan 
Agreement on Energy Cooperation for Central America and the 
Caribbean, which is designed to help the strained economies 
of the region develop and ward off economic breakdown. 45 
Under the agreement, Venezuela and Mexico sell crude oil to 
ten nations in the region, including left- and right-wing 
governments, at 70% of the world price, and provide soft 
loans at 4% to cover the balance. 46 In this way both 
Venezuela and Mexico diversify their buyers a bit more away 
from the United States. However, Venezuela stopped 
supplying oil to Nicaragua in 1982 because, Venezuela 
claimed, the Sandinistas' oil debt to Venezuela had grown 
too large. 47 Critics accused Venezuela of using oil as a 
political weapon, because Venezuela singled out Nicaragua 
when other Central American recipients were also not meeting 
their payments under the San Jos' Protoco1. 48 
Considered loosely in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, 
Contadora is a profitable venture for Venezuela. It 
represents a relatively cheap means of asserting 
independence from the U.S. Verbal declarations and 
negotiations represent a lower risk than dispensing foreign 
aid, especially at a time when Venezuela's external debt 
runs at $34 billion, making large foreign aid expenditures 
49 too costly for Caracas. 
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While Venezuela formulated foreign policies that were 
frowned upon in Washington, the country did not forget its 
important relationship with the U.S. Venezuela increased 
its oil exports to the U.S. during the Arab oil embargo, and 
was instrumental in preventing an OPEC-wide embargo. In the 
late 1970s Venezuela played the role of moderator between 
OPEC and the u.~. 50 Venzuela continued to receive large 
amounts of U.S. economic and military aid through the 
1970's. In 1973 alone, Venezuela received $133 million in 
credit toward the purchase of U.S. arms. 51 
Venezuela has enhanced its image through its active 
role in the Third World coalition. Venezuela's Minister of 
Mines in the early 1960s, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, is the 
acknowledged father of OPEc. 52 Many other Venezuelan 
statesmen have been and are leading figures of the 
nonaligned movement and of the Socialist International. On 
the heels of ending a longstanding reciprocal trade 
agreement with the United States, Venezuela joined the 
Andean Group and the Sistema Economico Latinamericano 
(SELA), both regional economic organizations. The Andean 
Group was created in 1969, and consists currently of 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. In the 
late 1970's, the Andean Group assumed a more political 
posture in nemispheric affairs. Venezuela and Mexico 
created SELA, which excludes the United States from 
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membership, but includes Cuba. It was to be a framework for 
exclusively Latin economic integration, but its impact has 
been limited. venezuela led the movement to reincorporate 
Cuba into the Latin American system and invited Cuba to join 
SELA; however, by 1981, relations between Venezuela and Cuba 
had become very cool. In 1981, Venezuela hosted and chaired 
the nonaligned Group of 77's conference, which was the 
precursor of the North-South conference held later that year 
. C M . 53 ~n ancun, ex~co. Venezuela also opposed the U.S. 
during the Malvinas/Falklands crisis of 1982. Venzuela, 
angered by the U.S. priority on its European ties, was 
Argentina's most vocal supporter in the hemisphere. 
Central American Policy 
With regard to Central America and the Nicaraguan 
revolution, President Perez denounced Somoza, and later, 
President Luis Herrera Campins lent no support to the U.S. 
d OAS k . f . N" 54 propose peace eep~ng orce ~n ~caragua. 
Venezuela initiated the Andean Pact's policy of recognizing 
the FSLN as a belligerent in Nicaragua in order to help them 
gain legal status, and global support during the revolution. 
Caracas sent arms to the FSLN and sent a joint mission with 
Ecuador to Managua on June 11, 1979, to discuss the 
N• • • • h s 55 ~caraguan cr~s~s w~t omoza. "Topics of these talks 
included various solutions to the crisis, the political and 
social basis for the popular revolt, and concessions, if 
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any, Somoza was willing to offer." 56 
While the Sandinistas were consolidating their victory 
in Nicaragua in 1979, the Christian Democrats won the 
presidency in Venezuela, and Napoleon Duarte, a Christian 
Democrat, became head of the El Salvadoran junta. Duarte's 
political affiliation, and the fact that he had spent years 
in exile in Caracas, combined to make El Salvador the focus 
of Venezuela's Central American policy. The Christian 
Democrats were more interested in helping their counterpart 
succeed in El Salvador than in helping a "rival" ideology in 
Managua. 57 Venezuela has opposed including Salvadoran 
guerrillas in the government, as it does not wish to see 
Duarte share power with them. Venezuela, together with 
Colombia, authored the counterdeclaration to the 
French-Mexican initiative favoring El Salvador's opposition, 
and thus appeared to be heading back into the U.S. fold. 
However, one should stress the Copei regime's commitment to 
the Christian Democratic member of the El Salvadoran junta. 
Venezuela denounced the French-Mexican initiative because it 
ran counter to its own policy, and possibly because its 
leaders ''saw the possiblity of increasing their influence 
through coordination or solidarity with U.S. policies." 58 
Venezuela patched up relations with Mexico and appeared 
to steer away from the U.S. in 1982. This can be explained 
by several factors, including the Falklands (or Malvinas) 
war in which the U.S. supported Great Britain against 
Argentina, and Venezuela lent vocal support to 
Argentina. 59 Another was Duarte's loss of a majority in 
El Salvador's assembly in the 1982 elections, and alleged 
lack of real control over the right-wing military cliques 
60 
and death squads. The Venezuelan Christian Democrats 
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also lost the presidency to the AD cnadidate Jaime 
Luisinchi. Initially, AD supported the Salvadoran rebels as 
a legitimate political force, and endorsed the Sandinista 
political process. However, AD seemed to change its 
position. Venezuela called for the demilitarization of 
Central America; however, Venezuela, under AD, has quietly 
continued training Salvadoran troops. When Duarte regained 
office in June 1984, and won control of El Salvador with the 
victory of the Christian Democrats March 31, 1985, AD 
expressed solidarity with Duarte, artd apparently changed its 
position toward the Salvadoran rebels. 61 The AD 
government, led by President Luisinchi, embraced Duarte, 
although less overtly than did former President, Christian 
Democrat, Herrera Campins, support Duarte in the junta of 
1981. Both Herrera and Luisinchi put a large rhetorical 
difference between Venezuela and Washington's Central 
American policy. Herrera assumed a ''bipolar world view 
emphasizing the struggle against Marxism," and his relations 
with Cuba were not good. 62 Under President Luisinchi, 
Venezuela is opposed to U.S. military intervention in 
Nicaragua, and has rallied to the Sandinista's defense on 
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occasion. On the other hand, Venezuelan officials have said 
that aid to Nicaragua is contingent on democratization of 
Nicaragua's political system. Luisinchi has maintained a 
public posture of support for Contadora, but leaders of the 
Democratic Action party have been skeptical of its real 
h f t . t• . C t 1 A · 63 c ances or nego ~a ~ng peace ~n en ra mer~ca. 
Summary 
To a smaller degree than Panama, Venezuela has been, 
and continues to be, economically dependent on the United 
States. Venezuela supported the U.S. policy toward Cuba, 
and was particularly hostile to Cuba in the 1960's, but led 
the movement to reincorporate Cuba into the inter-American 
system in the 1970's. Venezuela has also assisted the 
Sandinistas intermittently since 1979. But, with the 
cut-off of Venezuelan oil under the San Jose Accords to 
Nicaragua, Venezuela has decreased support for the 
Sandinistas. Relations with Cuba have cooled. The 
Venezuelans have been friendlier toward the El Salvador 
regime of Napoleon Duarte due to his affiliation with the 
Christian Democratic Party, and denounced a 1981 
French-Mexican declaration of support for the Salvadoran 
rebels. Venezuela publicly denounces U.S. policy in Central 
America, while Venezuelan troops covertly train Salvadoran 
armed forces. In this light, Venezuela's commitment to the 
Contadora Group is ambiguous. 
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Venezuela pursues her foreign policy goals through the 
Contadora Group because war in Central America would disrupt 
Venezuela's economic activities in the region, and would 
subordinate Venezuela's designs in the region for power to 
the conflict, particularly if the U.S. were involved. Like 
Panama, Venezuela fears a U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. 
Through the Contadora Group, Venezuela hopes to prevent that 
from happening. 
The roots of an independent Venezuelan foreign policy 
can be traced to the Betancourt Doctrine which was first 
applied in the 1940's. The Betancourt Doctrine was abandoned 
in 1968 for a principle of pluralism, and Venezuela appeared 
to back off from hostility toward Cuba. Venezuela has been 
very active in the Third World movement, which has lent it 
great prestige in that group of nations. Major foreign 
policy initiatives, and substantial foreign aid to countries 
in the Caribbean, followed Venezuela's sudden oil wealth of 
the 1970's. The bust in oil prices and Venezuela's 
overextension have decreased Venezuela's dramatic 
independent foreign policies. Venezuela pursues a foreign 
policy which it hopes will appear independent of the U.S., 
while the substantive content of its real policy resembles 
that of the U.S. Venezuela continues to favor Duarte in El 
Salvador, and is opposed to powersharing with Salvadoran 
opposition groups. Its relations with Cuba are no longer 
friendly, and its leadership appears to quietly endorse the 
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Reagan administration's position that Cuba is playing a 
subversive role in Central America. Venezuela continues to 
demand that Nicaragua democratize and pluralize its system. 
Venezuela's prestige has benifitted from participation 
in the Contadora Group. This goes toward Venezuela's goal 
of regional leadership. However, Venezuela has had to keep 
its covert training of Salvadoran troops under wraps. 
Venezuela's leaders do not want to Venezuela to appear as a 
U.S. proxy in Central America. The Contadora Group provides 
Venezuelan leaders with a means of promoting regional peace, 
while supporting Duarte in El Salvador. 
Colombia: Presidential 
Foreign Policy Making 
Since the 1920s, Colombia has had a uniquely loyal 
relationship with the United States. Both World War II and 
the Korean War reinforced this, by forging "a very strong 
political and military relationship between the United 
States and Colombia.'~ 4 In 1920, Colombia's President 
Suarez established the guiding princilple of Colombian 
foreign policy: Res Pice Polum, which means "Follow the 
North Star" (the United States). 65 Colombia was one of 
three Latin American countries which backed the U.S. fully 
at the 1942 Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of American 
States by recommending all American states break ties with 
I 1 d .. 66 Germany, ta y, an Japan. Although twelve Latin 
American states had signed a Mutual Defense Assistance 
Agreement with the United States by 1952, Colombia was the 
only Latin American country to send troops to Korea. 67 
Colombia adhered to the U.S. line toward Cuba in the early 
1960s, and introduced the resolutions in the OAS to impose 
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sanctions and break diplomatic relations with that country. 
Colombia was one of two South American countries that backed 
the United States in its support for Great Britain in the 
Malvinas/Falklands War. 68 This special alliance with the 
United States has guaranteed access to U S markets, but has 
cost Colombia an autonomous foreign policy. According to 
Gerhard Drekonja-Kornat, Colombia gave the U.S. unswerving 
loyalty in hemispheric and international affairs, in 
exchange for economic and militarJ aid, until late 1982. 
Colombia has had little opportunity to fashion new or 
bold foreign policies because Colombia's presidents have had 
to focus much of their attention on internal conflict, 
whether violence between the Liberal and Conservative 
parties, or from communist guerrillas, or drug barons. 
Colombia depended on U.S. assistance to combat its internal 
crises. Between 1961 and 1967, Colombia received 
approximately $60 million dollars in military assistance for 
counterinsurgency operations. 69 In 1980, Colombia 
negotiated a $16 million dollar aid package to battle 
C 1 b . ' t. . d 70 I dd. t. bl. o om 1a s narco 1cs 1n ustry. n a 1 1on, pu 1c 
pressure has already forced President Betancur to reduce his 
role in Contadora and focus even more attention on 
Colombia's four major guerrilla groups. 71 
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Colombian foreign policy making is dominated by the 
President, leaving the foreign ministry apparatus the more 
mundane matters of foreign relations and little opportunity 
to shape policy. Within the Ministry of Fo.reign Affairs they 
have dealt primarily with the resolution of boundary 
disputes with neighboring countries. These have been dealt 
with in line with the principles of nonintervention and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. 72 Colombia's opposition 
to U.S. foreign policy in Central America began when 
Betancur took office. His role in formulating Colombian 
foreign policy is pivotal. 
With respect to foreign economic policy, Colombia has 
asserted itself somewhat independently of the U.S. In 1973, 
Colombia joined both the Andean Pact and SELA. Membership 
in these regional groups was aimed at increasing Colombia's 
share of trade in the region; Colombia needed markets for 
its nontraditional goods. But these regional markets, and 
those in Japan, Western Europe, and the United States became 
saturated with nontraditional Colombian goods, such as 
nickel and natural gas, by the late 1970s. Colombian elites 
saw their only alternative market to be the Caribbean Basin. 
Furthermore, Colombian leaders also desired to become a 
regional power in the Caribbean. 73 Colombia reestablished 
diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1981, as most other Latin 
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American states were also doing so. 74 
A Regional Foreign Policy 
Through its membership in the Andean Pact, Bogota 
began to experiment with its foreign policy. Then-President 
Turbay Alaya had extended the principle of cooperation with 
neighboring countries to include all Andean Pact members at 
the same time that the Andean Pact nations' foreign 
ministers agreed to begin coordinating foreign policies. In 
June 1979 the foreign ministers of the Andean Pact member 
nations recognized the FSLN as a belligerent in Nicaragua. 
This announcement served to discredit the Somoza government 
and speeded up the process of removing him from power. 75 
Colombia also joined with other Latin American nations 
against the U.S. bJ voting in the OAS not to send a 
multinational peacekeeping force to Nicaragua in June 1979. 
However, for a period, Colombia realigned itself with 
the U.S. on the question of Nicaragua. The major reasons 
for this include internal threats from the M-19 guerrilla 
group which demanded the attention of the Colombian 
government, and a territorial dispute with the Sandinista 
government over the island of San Andres. 
Bogota correctly assumed that the 
Sandinistas, cataloged by the Reagan 
administration as 'totalitarian Marxists,' would 
fail in their claim for San Andres if Colombia was 
firmly and unconditionally allied with the United 
States. To reaffirm its loyalty to the United 
States, Colombia took a number of unilateral 
steps, such as: 
(1) blocking Cuban efforts to gain a seat on 
the U.N. SecuritJ Council in 1980-1981; 
(2) a break in diplomatic relations with 
Cuba in March 1981; 
(3) partial withdrawal from the group of 
nonaligned nations; 
(4) protesting the French commitment to 
Nicaragua and the armed oppositon in El Salvador; 
(5) sending observer~ 6 to elections held in 
El Salvador in March 1982. 
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Colombia accused Cuba of training Colombian guerrillas, and 
denounced the alleged Cuban- Colombian alliance. 77 
Colombia appeared ready to play a role in a military 
solution to the Central American crisis until 1983 when it 
joined the Contadora Group. Colombian arms expenditures 
grew from $600 illion dollars in fiscal 1982, to $2 billion 
dollars in fiscal 1983. 78 Former President Turbay opened 
a new military air base on Colombia's Caribbean coast in 
1982, and maintained a strong military presence in the 
Carribean, which Colombia's minister of defense said the 
country must be "equipped and ready either to dissuade or to 
act" in response to "threatened communist penetration" from 
N. 79 1caragua. 
However, the United States took for granted Colombia's 
loyalty and excluded Colombia from the Caribbean Basin 
initiative of 1982. Preferential treatment given to Central 
American and Caribbean competitors through this inititative 
hurt Colombia's nontraditional exports at a time when 
Colombia was counting on that region as a ~uch needed market 
for such exports. "As a neglected ally, Colombia saw the 
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urgency of formulating its own Caribbean policy.••80 
Although Colombia eventually won its claim on San Andres 
island, Colombians were angry with the U.S. for not 
supporting Colombia's claim for San Andres island with much 
vigor. 
Also, Turbay's term ended in 1982. President Belisario 
Betancur took office in August 1982, and quickly charted a 
new foreign policy for Colombia in Central America. He had 
several reasons for doing so. First, Colombia's prestige 
had been damaged by U.S. snubs. By asserting itself 
independently of the United States through the Contadora 
Group, Colombia hoped to restore some of that prestige. 
Second, Colombia had found that its unconditional loyalty to 
the United States had not paid off, particularly in economic 
terms. By seeking a peaceful resolution of the Central 
American conflict through the Contadora Group, Colombia 
hoped to avoid further disruption of its trade in the 
Caribbean basin. 
War in Central America could also serve to destabilize 
Colombia's internal affairs, and might lend strength to 
guerrilla move ents there. Since Betancur took office, 
Colombian diplomats have accused U.S. military aid to right 
wing forces in Central America of standing in the way of 
81 peace. It appears that Betancur has rejected the U.S. 
Cold War analysis of the region which his predecessor so 
heartily endorsed. Colombia's leadership, it can be 
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assumed, still wants to prevent further violence in the 
region from spreading to the volatile domestic front. 
Summary 
After a long history of supporting the U.S. foreign 
policy line, Colombia has asserted its independence through 
participation in the Contadora Group under the leadership of 
President Betancur. This suggests that President Belisario 
Betancur pursued membership in the Contadora Group out of 
1 b •t• d . t• 82 persona am 1 1ons an conv1c 1ons. While ex-President 
Turbay Alaya took a militaristic view of Central America, 
threatening Nicaragua with Reagan-sounding rhetoric, 
Betancur has rejected the U.S. perception of regional 
problems in terms of the Cold War, and noted that U.S. 
policy makers took Colombian support in Central America for 
granted. The Contadora Group has provided Betancur with an 
international forum, thus giving him a reputation as a world 
statesman. 
Other foreign policy motivations can be guessed at. 
One would be a desire to prevent the U.S. from taking 
military action in Central America and thus protect 
Venezuelan trade from the disruption that war in the region 
would bring. Another motive is Colombia's desire for a 
degree of regional power which activity in the Contadora 
Group may provide. 
Colombia's foreign policy independence is new, and 
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therefore fragile, however, Betancur aspires to make 
Colombia a regional power, and recognizes he must be willing 
to oppose the U.S. on some visible issue if that is to 
happen. 
Mexico: Maverick State 
Bilateral Relationship with the U.S. 
Mexican foreign policy has been a function of its 
relationship with the United States for over one hundred 
years. Consequently, Mexican foreign policy has been 
described as passive and defensive, emphasizing principles 
which could be invoked against an agressive United States. 
Only within the past 20 years or so has the 
nation repudiated its traditional inward looking, 
defensive attitude that proclaimed essentially 
negative dicta on anti-imperialistic policy 
positions designed to ward-off transgressions from 
the 'Colossus of the North.' The nation's foreign 
policy, such as it was, posited the inviolability 
of principles such as the self-determination of 
nations, absolute sovereignty, and 
nonintervention. Overall national policy states 
explicitly that Mexican interests were beg3 served 
by concentrating on internal development. 
Since World War II, Mexican elites have made internal 
economic growth their pri ary national goal. Such an 
emphasis has increased Mexico's dependence on the U.S. for 
investment, technology, loans, and food. However, Mexican 
ambivalence toward the U.S. is rooted in a history of 
political, military, and economic interventions by the U.S. 
in Mexico, which began shortly after Mexico's independence 
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in the early 1800's. Mexicans have never forgiven the loss 
of half their territory to the U.S. in 1848; independence 
from U.S. economic penetration was on of the major goals of 
the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920. U.S. troops have been 
sent to Mexico more than a dozen times; they have occupied 
Veracruz, and have marched across Sonora chasing the Mexican 
revolutionary Pancho Villa. Mexican author Octavio Paz has 
written about the longstanding barriers to understanding 
Mexico. Judging from Mexican presidential speeches, and the 
general tenor of U.S.-Mexican relations, many Mexicans 
perceive the treatment they receive from Americans to be 
lacking in respect. They resent the caricature of 
themselves as a nation of "wetbacks" held by many North 
Americans, and the manner in which they are looked down upon 
by _any U.S. citizens. U.S. views of Mexicans continue to 
be shaped by Hollywood stereotypes of "the lazy Mexican" who 
naps through the afternoon. 
These resentments and other perceptions remain in the 
collective consciousness of Mexico, and continue to shape 
Mexican foreign policy today. The desire to be free of U.S. 
domination has been, and continues to be, constrained by the 
reality of Mexico's dependence on the United States; 
positive U.S.-Mexican relations are of paramount concern to 
Mexico's leadership. Mexico has managed to avoid 
involvement in the Cold War, but has refused membership in 
the Nonaligned movement, and OPEC, the latter two probably 
out of a fear of angering the United States. 
Precendents for an Independent 
Foreign Policy 
Despite its assymetrical, dependent relationship with 
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the United States, Mexico has asserted itself in its foreign 
policy toward revolutionary or leftist governments and 
movements. 
In the 1920s, the Mexican government clashed 
with the United States over the latter's 
intervention in Nicaragua; in the 1930s, Mexico 
was one of the most outspoken defenders of 
Republican Spain and it later allowed the defeated 
Republicans §a set up a government-in-exile in 
Mexico City. 
The primary guiding principles of Mexican foreign 
policy include nonintervention and the right of 
self-determination of peoples. This is rooted in Mexico's 
own fear of foreign intervention during its own revolution, 
something which the United States threatened. 85 Mexico's 
position on diplomatic recognition reflects its commitment 
to nonintervention. The Estrada Doctrine, named for the 
foreign minister who formulated it in 1930, states that 
Mexico not withhold recognition of existing governments. 86 
"The Estrada Doctrine, therefore, allows Mexico to avoid 
the problem of passing judgement on the government of 
another country and, by that step, interfering in the its 
internal affairs." 87 The one exception, until 1979, to 
the Estrada Doctrine was Mexico's refusal to recognize 
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Franco's Spain. Mexican diplomats justified this position 
by saying that Franco's government was "the product of 
German and Italian fascist intervention in the Spanish Civil 
War of 1936-1939," so Mexico maintained formal relations 
. th th s . h b 1 . . . 1 8 8 w1 e pan1s repu 1can government 1n ex1 e. 
Mexico's calls for nonintervention aside, Mexico passed 
judgement on the Somoza regime and broke diplomatic 
relations with Nicaragua in 1979. Steve McShane interprets 
Mexico's breaking of ties with Somoza as a message to 
"military dictatorships in the area, particularly El 
Salvador and Guatemala,and to the United States ... that 
Mexico would support insurrections in cases where it 
believed that the existing government had lost domestic 
1 •t• n89 eg1 1macy. 
Many Latin American scholars claim that Mexico's own 
revolutionary background prompts it to support revolutionary 
movements and regimes. Some argue that this is only for 
domestic consumption, while others maintain that 
revolutionary ideals continue to shape Mexican foreign 
policy. The first arguement states that Mexico's ruling 
Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, is under pressure 
from its left wing, which Mexican presidents must 
acknowledge by using a progressive foreign policy to contain 
opposition to conservative and authoritarian domestic 
ones. 90 This analysis is accepted "by both the Left and 
the Right, at home and abroad" that domestic politics 
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predicate Mexican support of revolution abroad. 91 
However, Steve McShane argues that President L~pez 
Portillo's breaking of ties with Somoza in 1979 was not 
primarily aimed at placating the domestic left. McShane 
writes that while this action was very popular with the 
Mexican public, Lopez Portillo already enjoyed a high public 
approval rating credited to his stance taken with President 
Jimmy Carter four months earlier, successful negotiations 
with Fidel Castro just days earlier, and growing oil and 
92 
natural gas reserves. The second argument is presented 
by Edward Williams, among others, who contends that 
ideological considerations continue to play a role in 
shaping Mexican foreign policy. Whichever explanation is 
closest to the truth, historically, Mexico has been 
sympathetic to revolutionary movements and regimes, and its 
Central American policy in the 1980's is consistent with 
this tradition. 93 
Historically, Mexico has adhered to the principle of 
nonintervention with relation to the appearance of communism 
in the hemisphere. Mexico was the only Latin American 
country which by 1963 had not bowed to U.S. pressure to 
break diplomatic relations with Fidel Castro's regime in 
Cuba. Mexico's relations with Cuba have continued without 
, 
interruption up to the present, with Lopez Portillo 
referring to Cuba as Mexico's "dearest neighbor" in 
1981. 94 
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Mexico invoked the principles of nonintervention and 
self-determination against the 1965 U.S. intervention in the 
Dominican Republic, and against the U.S. invasion of Grenada 
in 1983. Such invasions threaten Mexico insofar as they are 
seen as precedents for future interventions in Mexico. 
This, in part, motivated Mexico's "no" to the U.S. proposal 
in the OAS to send a peacekeeping force to Nicaragua in 
1979. Unlike the United States, Mexico was supportive of 
the Allende government in Chile, and protested louldly the 
coup d'etat which ousted and killed him in 1973. Mexico 
accepted many political exiles from Chile following that 
coup. 95 
Mexico envisages an ideological pluralism in the 
hemisphere, which is rejected by the U.S. due to its Cold 
War analysis of the world. 
The Reagan administration has consistently 
argued that Mexico is the final domino in the 
chain of dominoes set off by Cuban-Soviet 
subversion in Nicaragua. The Mexicans, in turn 
reject this cold war definition of the Central 
American crisis and emphasize instead the economic 
inequality, social injustice and political 
repression that have sparked broad-based 
opposition movements in co~gtries like Nicaragua, 
El Salvador and Guatemala. 
Due to their own revolutionary experience, Mexicans do 
not assume that social upheaval necessarily leads to 
catastrophe. "For their part, most Mexicans tend to see the 
conflicts in Central America as logical and perhaps 
inevitable responses to historic conditions of repression 
and inequity." 97 In fact, many Mexicans perceive the 
U.S. to pose a greater threat to them of military 
intervention than the Soviet Union. This is because of · 
Mexico's proximity to the United States, the numerous U.S. 
interventions in Mexico in the last one hundred years, and 
the recognition that the Soviets would not be likely to 
attack Mexico as such an intrusion into the United States' 
sphere would risk a direct confrontation with the U.S. 
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The basic foreign policy principle of pluralism is 
still invoked to justify Mexico's foreign policy. Mexico 
regards tolerance of different kinds of regimes as necessary 
because increased polarization in Central America threatens 
the region's political and economic stability. The 
Mexican-Venezuelan Energy Program provides oil to the area's 
countries regardless of their policy orientation. In accord 
with the Estrada Doctrine, Mexico conducts diplomatic 
relations with all the region's states. In this way, Mexico 
rides the fence; by continuing to have relations with right 
wing dictatorships, Mexico can attempt to influence them, 
and also avoids angering the United States. Mexico calls on 
the United States to tolerate different types of regimes in 
the region, again invoking the principles of 
self-determination and pluralism. 
The Mexican leadership has a more sophisticated 
understanding of the roots of turmoil in Central America 
than perhaps do their northern counterparts. Since 1980, 
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news of paramilitary forces' activities in El Salvador and 
statements made by former members of the junta visiting 
Mexico to the effect that the military still controls 
Salvadoran politics have persuaded an already largely 
sympathetic Mexico that problems in El Salvador are largely 
due to the repressive style of the oligarchy. 98 This 
places some pressure on the Mexican government to support 
the revolutionary ~ovements in Central America, and suggests 
the Mexican government is articulating public opinion in its 
Central America policies. Mexico stresses the inequalities 
within a system which make it vulnerable to revolution, 
whereas the United States generally sees only Soviet-Cuban 
instigated instability. 
By befriending the revolutionary forces in Central 
America, many contend that Mexico is best able to influence 
the direction those regimes will take. 99 The U.S. policy 
is seen by Mexican officials as counterproductive as it is 
aimed at isolating revolutionaries, thereby driving "those 
stuggling for social justice into communist hands." 100 
President de la Madrid has expressed the belief that 
Nicaragua can retain its revolutionary characteristics arid 
yet diversify its relations away from the Eastern bloc. 101 
The Contadora Group has been able to attract aid to 
Nicaragua from Western Europe and Japan, thereby 
diversifying Nicaragua's relations away from the Soviet 
bloc. As an article in the Economist pointed out, Mexico's 
domestically conservative leaders have '~o sympathy 
whatsoever with the Soviet Union's ambitions for influence 
in the region." 102 Mexico has its own regional ambitions 
and has no desire to compete directly with the USSR. 
Moreover, Mexico's conservative political system could be 
destabilized by war or revolution on its southern border. 
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Mexican elites are aware of this, and seem anxious to avoid 
such a scenario. 
On a more pragmatic level, Olga Pellicer says Mexicans 
fear that if Central America becomes a pawn in the Cold War, 
Mexico may be next. 103 Mexico supports the Contadora 
efforts to remove U.S. military forces from Central America 
in large part because: 
Mexicans are particularly sensitive to the 
reestablishment of any United States troops on 
both their northern and southern borders, a type 
of encirclement seen from the Mexican perspective 
that would make a United States seizure of104 
southern Mexican oil fields more feasible. 
Oil Revenues Increase Affordable 
Policy Options 
In the mid-1970s, Mexico discovered vast new oil 
reserves. Increased oil production, exports, and revenues 
fueled an economic boom in Mexico. The increase in oil 
revenues also financed an active foreign policy which 
increasingly clashed with Washington. However, Mexico's 
foreign policy has continued to be limited by economic and 
technological dependence on the United States. 105 Mexican 
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leaders are aware of this, and have sought ''external markets 
and alliances which, it is hoped will bring about a 
diversification of dependence." 106 
Mexico initiated its present Central American policy in 
1979 when President L6pez Portillo severed ties with 
Anastasio Somoza's government in Nicaragua and recognized 
the FSLN as a belligerent. Mexico continued to help the 
Sandinistas once they assumed control of Nicaragua. From 
1979 to 1981, Mexico provided 16% of the total foreign aid 
received by Nicaragua. In 1981, Mexico and France issued a 
joint declaration that recognized the El Salvadoran 
opposition, the Democratic Revolutionary Front, or FDR, 
which has a guerrilla arm, as a representative political 
107 group. In 1982, President Lopez Portillo proposed a 
Central American peace plan which did not get off the 
ground. 108 These, and other moves, demonstrate Mexico's 
desire to be a regional leader in Central America and the 
Caribbean. 
Like the other Contadora members, Mexico wishes to 
enhance its regional leadership position, and sees a United 
States' intervention as preventing that goal from 
realization. A U.S. intervention in Central America would 
severely limit any regional leadership ambitions which 
Mexico might have. 
Mexican prestige has been enhanced by participation in 
the Mexican-Venezuelan Program of Energy Cooperation 
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discussed earlier in the section on Venezuela. This program 
is partially motivated by a desire help Central American 
states avoid further economic instability because of high 
oil prices. 109 Such instability would threaten Mexico in 
that Central America's economic problems mean economic 
refugees from the region pouring into and through Mexico in 
search of jobs. Economic problems in Central America would 
also impact on Mexico because of economic ties with the 
region's countries. 
The Mexican-Venezuelan arrangement also broadens the 
market for Mexican crude oil. Authors cautiously suggest 
that Mexico seeks economic advantage in Central America. 
One Mexican analyst sees opportunity for an expansion of 
Mexican economic activity in Central America as "small 
oligarchies and fuedal lords" lose their stranglehold in 
C 1 A . 110 entra mer~ca. Nicaragua has not paid Mexico for its 
oil purchases since late 1980, but Mexico continued delivery 
to Nicaragua until January of 1985, when officials 
renegotiated terms of the oil shipments. Nicaragua's 
ambassador to Mexico, Edmundo Jarqu{n Calder~n, "estimated 
Nicaragua's total debt to Mexico, accumulated over the past 
six yeras at, $500 million dollars." 111 Further violence 
in the region also threatens to upset the economies of the 
area. Again, Mexico opposes U.S. polices in Central America 
because they are bad for Mexico. 
Mexico continues its support of the Sandinistas through 
a variety of economic aid. In 1984, Mexico donated $23 
million dollars to Nicaragua for the hydroelectric project 
at Asturias, and gave $15 million dollars in credit to 
purchase fishing boats. 112 
Through participation in the Contadora Group, Mexico 
hopes to moderate the U.S. position and prevent further 
violence in Central America. Mexico sees the Reagan 
administration's military approach as responsible for 
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prolonging violence in the region. This violence, in turn, 
is the cause of the flight of the civilian populations from 
their homes in search of safety in the north. "Some 
estimates put the total number of El Salvadoran refugees in 
Mexico as high as 350,000 and the number of Guatemalans at 
around 100,000." 113 A 1981 estimate, made by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Mexico City, 
placed the number of Salvadoran refugees in Mexico at 
70,000. 114 Prolonged warfare, whether conventional or 
guerrilla in type, is not in the interest of Mexico. Mexico 
does not have the facilities to handle a large refugee 
population, and illegal Central American immigrants have 
never been welcome in an economy which cannot provide enough 
jobs for its own citizens. These, too, are reasons Mexico 
would pursue a solution through the Contadora Group. 
Important strategic considerations also shape Mexico's 
policy in Central America. Two key oil fields are located 
in the southern states of Chiapas and Tabasco, which border 
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on Guatemala. In 1981, the Mexican Army increased the 
number of troops in the southern province of Comitan from 
3,000 to 8,000. As the Mexican military totals a little 
more than 100,000 men, an increase of 5,000 men at one post 
. . .f. t 115 1s very s1gn1 1can • 
The southern states are Mexico's poorest, least 
developed, and continue to have large haciendas which are 
authoritarian, exploitative structures. The oil boom of the 
1970's brought with it social dislocation, which, in turn, 
lead to political protest. The influx of Central American 
refugees provides an additional destabilizing force in 
southern Mexico. 116 Should war break out on Mexico's 
southern border, not only could it threaten to destabilize 
Mexico, but the Mexican leadership would be forced to divert 
monies from domestic programs to the military. This would 
grant more power to Mexico's military, something which has 
been successfully avoided since the early 1940s, and which 
would be seen as threatening to the ruling party. 
Chapter Summary 
All the Contadora members fear a U.S. intervention in 
Central America. For various reasons, they perceive that 
such an intervention would not be in their best interests. 
Their professed goal is to prevent a regional war by 
negotiating a regional peace agreement. This policy is in 
opposition to U.S. foreign policy in the region; already 
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this hints at a reality of a more independent foreign policy 
line in these four countries, for they have rejected the 
U.S. policy for one of their own making. The Contadora 
Group members do not automatically accept the U.S. policy 
line. 
Historically, these four nations have reason to fear a 
U.S. intervention. All of them, with the exception of 
Venezuela, have been subject to numerous U.S. military 
interventions. Each has experienced tremendous political 
and economic domination by the U.S. Each continues to 
experience this domination and dependence in varying 
degrees. Panama has brought its commitment to Contadora 
into question with its participation in joint military 
maneuvers with the U.S. Venezuela appears to be pursuing a 
dual policy in Central America. Its leaders have pursued 
the Contadora process and criticized the Reagan 
administration's military policy in the region, while 
covertly training Salvadoran troops. The Salvadoran policy 
of the U.S. and Venezuela are very similar. Moreover, 
Venezuela and Panama both have violated sections of their 
own draft treaty. Venezuela has foreign military advisors 
in El Salvador, and Panama has hosted military exercises 
with the U.S. Venezuela's action brings its commitment to 
the peace process into serious doubt. It is not clear 
whether Panama would be bound by the restriction if the 
treaty ever becomes adopted, but many question President 
Ardito's motives. He has already lined up closer to 
Washington with his attendance at a U.S. workshop on U.S. 
policy toward Latin America. 
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Mexico has the longest history of an independent 
foreign policy of the four Contadora members. Historically, 
Mexico has frequently stood alone in support of 
revolutionary goverments which the U.S. opposed. Some 
credit this to Mexico's own revolutionary tradition. It is 
possible that Mexico's foreign policy in Central America, 
and thus for participating in the Contadora Group, is 
motivated by opposition to dictatorship, and a commitment to 
assisting revolution outside its borders. Mexico may truly 
share ideological sympathy with what it sees as indigenous 
revolution in Central America, or its support of these 
movements may be designed to placate a constituency which 
would otherwise be very critical of conservative domestic 
policies. The country's foreign policy has lived up to the 
revolutionary ideal, whether the motivation is either of 
these, or a mixture of the two. 
Increased trade with Central American states is the 
goal of all four Contadora members. All of them are 
attempting to diversify their trade and investment away from 
the U.S. so that they will be less dependent on the U.S. 
One small way of doing this is to capture more of the market 
in the region. The Contadora states fear war in the region, 
because their trade with Central American markets would 
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suffer. 
Diplomats in each country have accused U.S. military 
aid to right wing forces in Central America of standing in 
the way of peace. A Cold War view of Central America has 
been denounced by all four, but Venezuela's sincerity is in 
question due to a continuing Venezuelan training program of 
Salvadoran troops. Leadership in Mexico has explained the 
belief that by working with the revolutionaries, they stand 
to better influence them. 
Security also acts as a foreign policy determinant. 
Panama fears a U.S. intervention in the Canal Zone would 
follow a U.S. military escapade in Central America. 
Colombia, Mexico, and Panama each fears the instability that 
a regional war could bring to their political systems. 
Colombia fears the Central American revolutionaries might 
inspire or assist Colombian guerrillas. Mexico's southern 
states are particularly vulnerable, with their traditional 
socio-political systems which are already under strain from 
the oil boom and the influx of thousands of Central American 
refugees. Mexico does not want the refugees, and would be 
an unwilling host to many more should the violence in 
Central America escalate. Some scholars argue that Mexico's 
somewhat authoritarian system might be endangered by 
revolutionary fervor. Panama's military-dominated system 
could be vulnerable to revolutionary cries for democracy. 
Venezuela survived attacks by Cuban-supported leftist 
guerrillas during the 1960's, and few seriously doubt its 
vulnerability to revolution. However, it is useful to 
remember that Venezuela's relations with Cuba turned sour 
when Castro began actively supporting revolutionary 
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ovements agairi. Venezuelan leaders have not forgotton 
Castro's attempt to overthrow their system of government in 
the 1960's. 
Each country pursues a policy of prestige through 
participation in the Contadora Group. Of the four, only 
Panama is not pursuing regional leadership. Panama has 
sought an independent image for itself in the international 
community since the late 1960's. Participation in the 
Contadora Group contributes to an impression that all four 
of the Contadora members is not restricted in its foreign 
policy by its ties to the U.S. 
In each of the Coritadora countries, presidents, or in 
the case of Panama, the military chief command, have virtual 
control of their countries' foreign policy formulations. 
Both Colombian and Venezuelan Central American policies have 
made 180-degree turns since new presidents came into office 
in 1983. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CONTADORA PROCESS: 
PROPOSALS AND OBSTACLES 
The common and diverse foreign policy motivations of 
the Contadora member countries were analyzed in the 
preceding chapter. One hopes to shed light on the emergence 
and role of the Group by studying what motivates these four 
countries to participate in the Contadora process. In this 
chapter the focus will be on the Contadora process, and 
interactions between the Group, the Central American 
countries, the United States, and other international 
actors. Proposals and recommendations of the Contadora 
Group will be discussed. The various obstacles to the 
Contadora process will also be discussed, with particular 
attention paid to the United States. 
This chapter will include a short assessment of the 
Contadora Group's chances for obtaining a regional peace 
treaty. Through a discussion of the Contadora Group's 
efforts, and the role the United States plays in thwarting 
those efforts, an effort at evaluating the hypothesis that 
U.S. power has waned in the western hemisphere and that the 
international system has moved toward polycentrism. 
75 
76 
Formation and Early Meetings 
The collective efforts of the Contadora member states 
began January 5, 1983, when the foreign ministers of Panama, 
Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico, met to discuss ways of 
achieving a peaceful settlement of the Central American 
conflict. This chapter examines the Contadora process and 
U.S. attempts to thwart and manipulate that process. The 
Contadora Group has initiated and mediated negotiations 
between the Central American states, has drawn up several 
draft peace proposals, and has invoked global public opinion 
in the face of U.S. intransigence. The Reagan Administration 
first openly opposed the Contadora effort, but soon began 
giving it verbal support. One assessment of the Reagan 
Administration's strategy is "to play along, changing its 
demands when resolution seemed near and stepping up the war 
when peace threatens to break out."1 
After its first meeting January 8-9, 1983, the 
Contadora Group released a statement which became known as 
the Contadora Declaration, or Accord, and indicated that the 
Contadora Group did not itself plan to present finished 
peace proposals, but hoped to mediate negotiations between 
Nicaragua and four U.S. allies in Central America: 
Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala. 2 The 
Accord reflected a rejection of the U.S. view of the Central 
American crisis in terms of the Cold War in favor of a 
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perspective which views origins of revolutionary movements 
in terms of the economic, social, and political inequalities 
found in each country. 3 The document identified El 
Salvador's civil war, and the fighting between Nicaragua and 
anti-Sandinistas, or contras, which have been alleged to be 
operating out of Honduras and Costa Rica, as the region's 
major troubles. The Accord stressed the need to end foreign 
military aid and intervention in Central America, and to 
withdraw foreign military advisors. 4 
The Contadora ministers met again in Panama City on 
April 11 to review the January Declaration, before shuttling 
to the capitals of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and El Salvador April 12-13. There, they spoke 
with heads of state and foreign ministers, and arranged for 
the first joint meeting of the Contadora Group with the 
foreign ministers of the Central American countries 
subsequently held in Panama City April 20-21, 1983. The 
primary goal of this joint meeting, and others in the months 
of May and June, "was to create a climate of confidence for 
initiating substantive negotiations on each of the issues in 
dispute." 5 
This first joint meeting, according to the Mexican 
delegation, was designed to reduce regional tensions and 
establish "the basis for a stable and durable peace in the 
area." 6 The most pressing concern was to prevent the 
border conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras from 
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escalating into a major military confrontation. The border 
conflict centers on the existence of contra bases in 
Honduras, from which, Nicaragua says, the rebels stage 
attacks into northern Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan government 
demands the bases be dismantled, while Honduras denies their 
. 7 
exJ.stence. 
However, "the talks were reportedly hindered by the 
refusal of the Nicaraguan and Honduran foreign ministers to 
negotiate directly with each other." 8 However, they were 
not above exchanging insults: 
When Honduran foreign minister Edgardo Paz 
Barnica charged that Nicaragua was 'occupied' by 
15-17,000 foreign advisers, his Nicaraguan 
counterpart, Miguel D'Escoto, suggested that 
~erhaps he should take up residence in a 
psychiatric clinic.' Costa Rica foreign minister 
Fernando Volio returned the compliment in kind: 
'Never believe Marxists w~o say they are looking 
for peace,' he cautioned. 
The representatives of the nine nations could not reach 
agreement on the content of a joint declaration, so three 
separate statements were issued: one by the Contadora 
Group, one by Nicaragua, and one by the other four Central 
A . f . . . t 10 mer1can oreJ.gn mJ.nJ.s ers. The ministers were unable 
to settle the issue of whether the peace talks would be on a 
regional or bilateral basis. Nicaragua favored bilateral 
talks, but the other four Central American governments 
wanted regional talks. The Contadora ministers themselves 
could not "agree on whether a regional agreement would be 
effective or whether bilateral accords are needed." 11 
Nonetheless, as a bulletin released by the Contadora 
Group stated, "for the first time in the course of the 
present crisis, the Central American Ministers for Foreign 
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Affairs had joined in a common effort to establish a 
dialogue."12 The foreign ministers had been able to agree 
with the January Contadora Accord that the responsiblity for 
• th • • h • • d I 13 peace 1n e reg1on 1s t e1r own, not outs1 ers . The 
representatives extended the meeting through the 22nd, and 
drew up an agenda for negotiations to begin in May, which 
consisted of: the regional arms race, the illegal arms 
trade, the presence of foreign military advisors, 
destabilization efforts by various countries, verbal threats 
and agression, acts of war and border tensions, and the 
violation of human rights. 14 
The Contadora Group ministers moved their fourth 
meeting forward from May 27 to May 11 due to an increase in 
U.S.-Nicaraguan tensions. The main topic of concern was a 
Costa Rican request of the Organization of American States 
to establish a peacekeeping force along its border with 
Nicaragua. The border area had become the scene of heavy 
fighting in April, 1983, when contras reportedly began 
launching strikes against Nicaragua from within Costa Rica. 
Nicaragua allegedly violated Costa Rican airspace by sending 
aircraft on reconnaissance missions to search out the rebel 
camps. The Contadora ministers bewailed the escalation of 
the conflict in a statement released on May 15th. The 
Contadora ministers agreed to send an 11-person civilian 
observer commission to inspect the border situation and 
submit recommendations. The statement said "the observers 
will include two representatives from each of their four 
countries."15 Venezuela alone had supported sending an 
armed peacekeeping force. 16 
The United Nations Security Council unanimously 
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approved Resolution 530 on May 19, 1983, to back the efforts 
of the Contadora Group to bring a negotiated settlement to 
the Central American conflict. Nicaragua and seven other 
Third World countries sponsored the resolution. The 
Security Council: 
2. Commends the efforts of the Contadora 
Group and urges the pursuit of those efforts; 
3. Appeals ur~ently to the interested 
States to co-operateully with the Contadora 
Group, through a frank and constructive dialogue, 
so as to resolve their differences; 
4. Ur~es the Contadora Group to spare no 
effort to fin solutions to the problems of the 
region and to keep the Security t~uncil informed 
of the results of these efforts. 
The U.S. agreed to vote for the resolution only after 
Nicaragua agreed to drop three proposals from the original 
draft. 18 
The next Contadora Group meeting, held in Panama City, 
May 28-30, included the Central American Foreign Ministers. 
The nine foreign ministers confirmed the Costa 
Rica-Nicaragua border observer commission's mandate. It was 
deemed to act as an adivisory body on all border problems in 
h . 19 t e regJ.on. The nine ministers also agreed to form a 
technical group consisting of representatives of the nine 
participating nations. This body's job was to advise the 
Contadora ministers of the most effective procedures in 
reaching a peaceful solution to the conflict. The 
techinical group's recommendations were due the fourteenth 
20 of July at the next meeting of the Contadora Group. 
On June 19, 1983, the European Economic Community 
leaders endorsed the efforts of the Contadora Group at a 
21 three-day summit meeting in Stuttgart, West Germany. 
Cuba had begun to publicly support the Contadora effort by 
the next meeting of the Contadora Group ministers and the 
Central American foreign ministers. Fidel Castro stated 
July 28th that Cuba would abide by any agreements made by 
"all the parties involved" for all foreign advisors to be 
withdrawn from the area, and/or for the cessation of arms 
trade with Central American nations. 22 
United States Manipulating 
Central American Allies? 
Also on July 19, 1983, Nicaragua presented a plan to 
the Contadora Group which dealt with the region's military 
problems, and dealt squarely with the concerns previously 
stated by the U.S. and its allies. The Nicaraguans' 
proposal included an end to weapons deliveries to El 
Salvador, an end to all military support for subversives 
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attacking one of the region's governments, and respect for 
the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of 
a country. 23 This pledge was largely what the 
, 
"Declaration of San Jose" of 1982 had been after. This 
document, signed by Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Colombia, the U.S., and others, had called for: 
[An] end to support, supply, training or 
command of terrorist or subversive elements 
operating against other states in the region; an 
end to arms trafficking in the region; a ban on 
importing offensive heavy weapons; and a regional 
limit on armaments to legiti2~te defense needs of 
the countries in the region. 
However, the Central Americans (minus Nicaragua) 
shifted their bargaining position at the urging of the 
United States. 25 Military non-aggression and 
non-interventionism were no longer sufficient. The new 
proposals of Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and El 
Salvador called for the establishment of participatory 
democratic institutions in all Central America. Sections of 
the proposals which dealt with those matters were, in fact, 
very vague. 26 This was one of the first times of many in 
which the US has undermined the Contadora process by 
encouraging its allies and clients in Central America 
(Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica) to make 
counter-proposals to those previously agreed upon at joint 
meetings of the Contadora and Central American foreign 
. . t 27 m1n1s ers. 
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The Cancun Summit 
The Contadora Ministers met July 14, 1983, in Panama 
City to draft the agenda for the planned summit meeting of 
the presidents of the Contadora countries, which took place 
in Cancun, Mexico, July 26-17, 1983. 28 Mexico had called 
the presidential summit, and the other presidents agreed to 
attend because of the heightened conflict in Central 
America, evidenced by an escalation of violence and border 
incidents, and the fear that the "Honduran-Nicarguan border 
1 h ld d • • 1 II 2 9 c as es cou egenerate 1nto a reg1ona war. The 
presidents produced what has been termed the Cancun 
Declaration, a "bland and noncontroversial peace formula" 
which called on the Central American nations to use the 
following guidelines in working out an agreement: 
1) An end to all present 'situations of 
belligerence.' 
2) A freeze on offensive weapons at their 
present levels. 
3) Control and reduction of weapons 
inventories, with adequate inspection. 
4) A ban on 'the existence of military 
installations of other countries in their 
terri tory.' 
5) Advance notice of troop movements near 
borders. 
6) Joint border patrols by neighboring 
countries or supervision of frontiers by 
international observers. 
7) Multilateral security commissions to 
prevent or settle border incidents. 
8) Internal controls on arms smuggling 
across borders. 
9) Promotion of a relaxation of tension 
through an end to statements and actions that harm 
the climate of mutual confidence. 
10) Coordination of direct communication 
systems to end armed clashes an~0generate an 
atmosphere of mutual confidence. 
The Cancun Declaration also stressed the need for economic 
development, regional integration, and political democracy 
in solving the underlying social, economic and political 
bl . . t b'l' . h . 31 pro ems caus1ng 1ns a 1 1ty 1n t e reg1on. 
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Like other Contadora statements, the Cancun declaration 
did not include ideological differences of East and West, 
nor their supposed competition for hegemony in Central 
America as possible causes of the region's problems. They 
continued to assert that the issues are Central American and 
should be settled by Central Americans, not outside powers 
such as the U.S. However, the Contadora presidents appealed 
to President Ronald Reagan and Premier Fidel Castro, and to 
the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the OAS to 
support their peace-making efforts. 32 
The Contadora ministers postponed a joint meeting with 
the Central American foreign ministers set for August 
26-29,1983, until September 7, 1983. At this meeting, the 
ministers proposed establishing three task forces to study 
political, security, and economic and social issues ''to 
accelerate the analysis and discussion of the subjects on 
the agenda, as well as to oversee the implementation of 
determined solutions."33 
85 
The Document of Objectives 
Also at the September meeting, the group approved, in 
principle, a package called the "Document of Objectives" 
which was designed as a guide for efforts to achieve a peace 
treaty for the region. The twenty-one principles of 
agreement include an end to conflicts in the area, an end to 
the regional arms race, an end to the illegal arms trade, 
and negotiations on reductions in numbers of weapons and 
troops. The document also includes a prohibition on foreign 
military installations in the region, a removal of foreign 
military advisors, an end to support of subversive or 
terrorist groups, particularly allowing the use of one's 
territory by such groups. The document also calls for 
( 
economic development assistance to the Central America 
countries, and, a general restructuring of the international 
34 
economic system. 
The 21-point document was ratified by all the Central 
American countries by September 27, 1983. 35 However, 
their actions were not yet limited in practice as the 
document was only a draft treaty. 36 
When prospects for success in the Contadora 
negotiations were optimistic, the United States revealed a 
lack of commitment to resolving the Central American confict 
through peaceful means. Only three days after the tentative 
acceptance of the Document of Objectives in September, U.S. 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, 
reasserted her commitment to a military victory over 
"international commmunism" in Central America. 37 During 
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the Contadora Group meeting of September 7-10, 1983, the CIA 
escalated its war against Nicaragua: 
It was revealed that sabotage actions carried 
out against Nicaragua's oil facilities last 
September and October by frogmen, speedboats and 
airplanes were actually carried out by CIA 
operatives independent of the contras •••• Air 
attacks in February against a military base and 
radio facility were also carried out by the CIA, 
although again the contras claimed credit. The 
timing of these attacks to coincide with 
Nicaragua's announcement of an election date 
suggests an effort to disrupt Nicaragua's 
electoral process. The contras also claimed 
credit for another unilateral CIA o~eration, the 
laying of some 600 a~%oustical [sicJ mines in 
Nicaragua's harbors. 
In October, at a joint meeting of Contadora and Central 
American foreign ministers, Honduras requested the 
establishment of a working group to "study measures to 
strengthen the defensive and security capabilites of the 
countries, which would act under the guidance of the 
Interamerican Defense Council." 39 
During October 22-23, 1983, the Contadora Ministers met 
with their own ambassadors to the United Nations, as well as 
their ambassadors to the various Central American countries 
in Panama City. The meeting was dominated by devising a way 
to implement the Document of Objectives. 
In mid-November, Nicaragua sent some 1,200 Cuban 
advisors (of a total of 8,000) home. This appeared to 
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observers to be a result of Nicaragua's desire to make a 
good-faith move by abiding by the L1-point "Document of 
Objectives" drawn up by the Contadora Group and the Central 
American foreign ministers. The U.S. rejected this action as 
. . d . d th b . . . f. t 40 1ns1ncere, an sa1 e num ers were 1ns1gn1 1can . 
The UN General Assembly passed a stongly worded 
resolution proposed by the Contadora Group members in 
support of the Contadora Group November 10, 1983, which 
II d 11 f • • h • 41 con emns acts o aggress1on 1n t e reg1on. The 
General Assembly passed another resolution in October 1984, 
which urged the five Central American countries to expedite 
talks with the Contadora Group and sign the Act as soon as 
"bl 42 poss1 e. 
The Contadora M1nisters continued to fine-tune the 
Document of Objectives until the formal signing by the 
Central American toreign ministers in Panama City, at the 
fifth joint meeting ot Central American toreign ministers 
and the Contadora Group January 8, 1984, of the "Norms for 
the Execution of the Assumed Compromises in the uocument of 
Objectives.•A3 They also established three worKing 
commissions which are to "prepare studies, legal drafts and 
recommendations .•. and make proposals for veritying and 
n44 
supervising implementation ot the measures agreed on. 
The contadora Group convened the three working commissions 
on January 31, 1984. 
Again the U.S. stepped up the pace of its military 
policy in Central America. The CIA began the mining of 
Nicaragua's harbors in January, and in early February 
conducted air strikes on targets in Nicaragua. 45 U.S. 
Deputy Secretary of State, Steven Bosworth, explained the 
Reagan Administration's view of escalation of its military 
power as consistent with the Contadora process: "We have 
the obligation to provide military and economic assistance 
to U.S. allies in Central America in order that they don't 
feel subordinated to Nicaragua."46 
Under pressure from Congress, President Reagan had 
established the National Bipartisan Commission on Central 
America in July 1983, dubbed the Kissinger Commission for 
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its chairperson, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. 
The Kissinger Commission presented its report on the same 
day as Contadora announced its January 8 agreement. 47 The 
Kissinger Commission's report superficially praised the 
Contadora Group, while also making "it quite clear that 
Contadora will be ignored if the group's evolving policies 
do not coincide with Washington's interests." 48 The 
Kissinger Report provided "an overall rationale for 
deepening US involvement" in Central America and endorsed 
the Reagan administration's policy there. 49 
The Contadora Group met February 27-28, 1984, and 
underscored its resolve to find a stable and lasting peace 
in Central America. It also noted the need to 
"scrupulously" carry out the measures put forward in the 
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Document of Objectives. 50 Nicaragua and Costa Rica signed 
a border agreement to allow joint inspection of their common 
border at a joint meeting May 15, 1984. The measure, drawn 
up by the Contadora Group, created a commission which is 
responsible for inspection of the border area and is to be 
free to cross the border at will. 51 
The Contadora Group presented a draft peace agreement 
to the five Central American presidents June ~-10, 1984. 
The agreement, formally called "The Contadora Act for Peace 
and Cooperation in Central America," includes a draft 
protocol that the Soviet Union, the United States, and other 
"outside countries" would be invited to sign to show 
evidence of support for the agreement. 52 This treaty, or 
Acta put into concrete terms the twenty-one points of the 
Document of Objectives, and was to be signed by the five 
C t 1 Am . t 53 en ra er1can governmen s. 
The draft treaty calls for mutual reductions 
in arms, troops, and foreign advisors among 
Central American nations, and includes a 
prohibition against the establishment of foreign 
military bases. It would also bar countries from 
providing support to irregul~~ forces trying to 
overthrow other governments. 
This was designed to stop U.S. support of the 
Honduran-based contras, and any Nicaraguan or Cuban aid that 
may be going to Salvadoran rebels. The U.S. would be 
expected to close its bases and military school in Honduras 
and remove its military advisors from the region; Nicaragua, 
in turn, would reduce the number of foreign advisors within 
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its borders, and would agree not to permit any foreign 
.1. b . t . 55 m1 1tary ase on 1ts err1tory. 
The five Central American governments did not meet the 
July 15, 1984, deadline to sign the Contadora Group's "Act 
f d . u56 or Peace an Cooperat1on. Guatemala did indicate in 
July that it would sign the Act "after clarifying some 
57 procedural points. Before the meeting in late 
September, both Honduras and El Salvador announced 
"unofficially," that they were prepared to sign the Act, but 
Nicaragua continued to express strong reservations about 
signing it. At that joint meeting in September, the five 
Central American foreign ministers discussed their 
objections to the Act, and many of them were worked into a 
revised version of the Act. 58 
Nicaragua Surprises U.S. with Intent 
to Sign Contadora Draft Treaty 
After the meeting, the Sandinistas alone agreed to sign 
the draft treaty as is. The other Central American 
governments had expressed support for the plan, but soon 
lost their enthusiasm under pressure from the u.s. 59 
Managua's formal pledge to sign the treaty caught the United 
States by surprise. The U.S. previously "had given blanket 
endorsement to the peace process but never expected 
Nicaragua to sign such a treaty." 60 The U.S. withdrew 
support it had previously given the Act, and tried to 
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discredit the Sandinista government. The Reagan 
administration said the Nicaraguan decision was designed to 
f d 1 t 1 t . 61 I th' th cover up rau u en e ec ~ons. n ~s way, e 
administration built a case for supporting the contras, 
based on the claim that the Sandinista government is 
non-democratic and totalitarian. 62 
Upon second look, the United States cited problems with 
the plan and urged its allies to alter specific provisions. 
The U.S. balked at the treaty for a number of reasons, 
including its requirements that the U.S. close its bases and 
withdraw support from the contras. The treaty would 
effectively end the anti-Sandinista war by forbidding 
countries, such as Honduras and Costa Rica, to allow their 
territories be used as sanctuaries. A generalized arms 
reduction, withdrawal of foreign military advisors and 
troops, the closing of U.S. bases, and reduction of the 
region's armed forces, as proposed in the Contadora treaty, 
would leave the U.S. with few viable alternative measures by 
which to exercise power in Central America. 63 
Furthermore, the treaty would leave the Sandinista regime in 
power, something Reagan administration hardliners have 
decided they cannot live with. 64 The Reagan 
administration cited the inadequate verification measures of 
treaty provisions, and demanded more specific timetables for 
foreign advisor and troop withdrawals, and tighter 
regulation of democratic elections. 65 
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The European and Central American foreign ministers met 
/ September 28-19, 1984, at the San Jose, Costa Rica, summit. 
The United States was excluded, but Secretary of State, 
George Shultz, was very much present in the form of a cable 
sent to the Europeans. It heavy-handedly asked the 
Europeans not to increase political or economic aid to the 
Sandinistas, and that the source of problems in Central 
America are the Soviets. The European ministers were 
"incensed" and rebuffed Shultz as an uninvited intruder. 66 
The Europeans included all members of the European Economic 
Community plus Spain and Portugal. They do not regard the 
Central American conflict as an opportunity for Soviet 
expansionism. Instead, they fear that the U.S. will attempt 
armed intervention in the region and will then pull NATO 
into the hostilities. 67 The Europeans included Nicaragua 
in the regional economic aid package. 68 
Although not a party to the Contadora process, the 
Reagan Administration made its feelings about the proposed 
treaty known: 
At the UN's 39th General Assembly, US 
Secretary of State George Shultz met jointly with 
the region's foreign ministers, excluding 
Nicaragua. Then on October 12, 1984, at the 
inauguration ceremonies for Panama's new 
president, Nicolas Ardito Barletta, Shultz met 
individually with Panamanian, Colombian, Costa 
Rican, and Guatemalan officials, and later visited 
El Salvador and Mexico for talks with officials in 
those two countries. The Contadora negotiations 
were the central point in the meetings 59but the 
specific topics discussed are unknown. 
Mr. Shultz was not the only U.S. diplomat lobbying 
Central American governments not to accept the Contadora 
proposal after the Nicaraguans announced their pledge to 
sign it. U.S. special envoy to Central America, Harry 
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Schlaudeman, toured the four other governments in the region 
a few days after Managua's declaration. He "exerted 
discreet but strong diplomatic pressure ••• to take 
less-than-positive positions toward the treaty." 70 
According to a secret background paper prepared for a 
National Security Council meeting which was obtained by The 
Washington Post, the U.S. blocked adoption of the Contadora 
treaty by exerting intense pressure on El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Costa Rica and by persuading them to withdraw 
their support from the treaty. 71 As Central America's 
dominant trade partner and primary source of economic and 
military assistance, and often the controlling influence in 
the world's major financial institutions, the U.S. was able 
to get Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador to bend to its 
pressure. 72 
Following consultations with U.S. officials, Honduran 
Foreign Minister Edgardo Paz Barnica called for all five 
Central American foreign ministers to meet October 19, 1984, 
in Tegucigalpa to review the Contadora proposal. Nicaragua 
boycotted the meeting, charging that the meeting was 
prompted by U.S. efforts to derail the Contadora process, 
and that revisions should only be discussed jointly with the 
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Contadora Group. 73 Guatemala attended the meeting, but 
did not propose any changes in the draft treaty, nor did it 
endorse the new version. Guatemala's ambassador to the 
U.S., Frederico Fashen, said that his country took this 
position because Nicaragua was not involved when the changes 
were made. 74 These three countries submitted a 
counterdraft to the Contadora proposal which reflected U.S. 
security interests. 75 This plan eliminated sections 
banning all international military exercises from the area. 
The Washington Post said that the National Security Council 
secret briefing paper said: 
We have effectively blocked Contadora Group 
efforts to impose a second draft of a revised 
Contadora Act. Following intensive U.S. 
consultations with El Salvador, Honduras and Costa 
Rica, the Central American [sic] submitted a 
counterdraft to the Contadora states on October 
20, 1984 ••• [that] shifts concern within Contadora 
to adocument broadly consistent with U.S. 
interests •••• We will continue to exert strong 
pressure on Guatemala to supp~gt the basic core 
four [counterdraft] position. 
In a major departure from the Contadora proposal, the 
counterdraft permits the holding of international military 
maneuvers in Central American nations. It also omitted a 
protocol which asked for signatory countries outside the 
region to pledge support for the Contadora treaty. 77 
Mexican Foreign Minister, Bernardo Sepulveda Amor, said 
the Contadora Group would reject any changes which could 
"serve as a pretext to reopen the negotiations in what would 
be an interminable process.'JS 
Nicaragua refused to negotiate based on the 
counterdraft, while Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras 
have refused to do so if their new plan is not included in 
h t . t• 79 Th c t d . . t e nego 1a 1ons. e on a ora negot1at1ons were 
stalemated and did not resume for another six months. 
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In November, the OAS passed a resolution supporting a 
Contadora Group report, but Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa 
Rica supported the resolution with the understanding that 
the final version of the Contadora peace treaty would 
include those changes they had recommended at 
T . 1 80 eguc1ga pa. 
Contadora Talks Cancelled 
The Contadora Process lay fallow until March 21-22, 
1985, nearly six months after the aborted draft peace plan 
of October 1984. The months of inactivity placed the 
Contadora Group's effectiveness in grave doubt. In the 
opinion of many observers, the Contadora Group faces the 
same warlike conditions in the region that existed two years 
when it was formed two years. 81 Between October 1984 and 
January 1985, the Contadora ministers held separate closed 
meetings with the foreign ministers of the Central American 
countries in an effort to revive the negotiating 
process. 82 The Contadora Group met January 8-9, 1985, to 
plot strategy to get all five Central American foreign 
ministers to the negotiating table again. 83 They planned 
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to persuade the Central American foreign ministers to set 
aside the "surprise" alternative peace plan presented by El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras on October 19, 1984, and, 
instead, return to the Contadora-sponsored "Act of Peace and 
Cooperation in Central America."84 They also made some 
revisions in the Act which the foreign minister of 
Venezuela, Isidro Morales Paul, said "aim at bringing all 
the parties closer together."85 But perhaps the most 
significant thing to emerge from this meeting was the 
group's first explicit reference to the United States, and 
whose support the Contadora ministers are alleged to have 
acknowledged as necessary to the achievement of a workable 
86 
regional peace treaty. Each of the parties to the 
Contadora Group recognize that an effective Central American 
peace agreement will require U.S. support. They set the 
date for the next joint meeting for February 14, 1985, in 
Panama. 
It appeared that all parties would attend the scheduled 
February meeting: 
A few weeks before the date of the meeting 
that would have approved the rough draft of the 
Acta of Cooperation for Peace, with the proposed 
modifications, the political sectors in favor of 
the negotiations felt optimistic because Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica were beginning to overcome their 
diplomatic87onflict within the frame of Contadora. 
However, a dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua about an 
alleged violation of political asylum by Nicaraguan police, 
prompted Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador to boycott 
the February 1985 meeting, thereby forcing its 
cancellation. 
Dispute Over Political Asylum 
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The object of this dispute was a 37-year old Nicaraguan 
draft evader, Jose Manuel Urbina Lara. Urbina had taken 
refuge in the Costa Rican embassy in December, 1984, and had 
been arrested by Nicaraguan security agents. Costa Rica 
charged that Nicaraguan authorities had stormed the embassy 
to arrest Urbina, a violation of the right of political 
asylum and of diplomatic protocol. The Sandinistas 
maintained that Urbina was not arrested until after he had 
voluntarily left the embassy. Urbina was tried for 
desertion in a Nicaraguan military court and sentenced to a 
five-year prison term. 88 The Costa Rican government 
announced January 10, 1985, that it would boycott all 
Contadora meetings until Urbina was freed or allowed to 
emigrate to Costa Rica. 89 On January 17, in what it 
called an "act of solidarity" with the Costa Rican 
government, Honduras announced that it, too, planned to 
boycott the scheduled February 14 meeting unless Nicaragua 
released Urbina in accord with the Costa Rican demand. The 
next day El Salvador announced its support of the boycott, 
and denounced the Sandinista government as 
t 1 . t . 90 to a J. arJ.an. 
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U.S. Strategy to Block Contadora 
Reagan administration officials said the U.S. supported 
the boycott, and a State Department aide said that the U.S. 
was "sympathetic to Costa Ricans' complaints". Nicaragua 
charged that the United States had manipulated the three 
countries to participate in the boycott in an effort to 
bl k th C t d . •t• t• 91 oc e on a ora 1n1 1a 1ve. Two factors lend weight 
to Managua's allegations. First, in January, United States 
National Security Council Advisor, Robert McFarlane very 
quietly toured Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, 
and Panama, and second, the U.S. abruptly suspended 
bilateral talks with Nicaragua upon McFarlane's return to 
T.7 h• 92 was 1ngton. 
The Administration asserted that Nicaragua was not 
showing a "serious" interest in the talks as reason for 
their suspension. This appears to be no more than rhetoric, 
because President Reagan scorned peace overtures made in 
March by Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega. Reagan said 
Ortega's offers to halt all foreign arms purchases and send 
home 100 more Cuban military advisors were without 
substance. 
The Reagan administration ••. tied a resumption 
of the talks to progress in the Contadora 
negotiations. However, observers are drawn to the 
conclusion that the suspension of talks, combined 
with the boycott by U.S. allies in the93egion, is 
precisely intended to block Contadora. 
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When the U.S. announced its decision to walk out of the 
negotiations the World Court at The Hague had indicated it 
supported Nicaragua's complaint that the U.S. is in 
violation of international law by engaging in covert efforts 
to overthrow the government of Nicaragua during 
t . 94 peace 1.me. 
Since July 1984, U.S. special envoy to Central America, 
Harry Schlaudeman, and Nicaragua's vice-minister of foreign 
relations, Victor Tinoco, met nine times in Manzanillo, 
Mexico. The bilateral talks were designed to parallel the 
Contadora negotiations. Washington's walk-out on the 
Manzanillo talks was seen in Venezuela as a withdrawal of 
U S t f th C t d d . . 9 5 
.• supper or e on a ora peace me 1.at1.on. 
A cabinet-rank advisor to Venezuela's President Jaime 
Lusinchi blamed Contadora's problems on enmity between the 
United States and Nicaragua said: 
Contadora is at a dead point. Unless we 
obtain a clear definition of support from the 
Reagan Adminstration for a realistic agreement in 
the regi~g, our good offices are not going to 
prosper. 
A Mexican diplomat credited the problem to "deepening 
political antagonism between Costa Rica and Nicaragua that 
has left both sides unwilling to make concessions."97 The 
Contadora Group had mediated an unsuccessful series of 
secret meetings in Panama during the first half of February 
to resolve the tension between the two countries. 98 
Former Colombian Foreign Minister and architect of the 
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original draft peace treaty, Rodrigo Lloredo Caicido put it 
simply: "Contadora was trying to swim against the tide."99 
It is reported that a pronounced split has emerged in 
the Contadora Group due to the stalemate: 
Mexico strongly supports Nicaragua's position 
and seeks U.S. concessions. Venezuela, Colombia 
and Panama have more sympathy for the concerns of 
the_Unit55 States and its allies in the 
reg1on. 
Contadora Talks Resumed 
Nicaragua released Jose Urbina Lara on March 6, 1985, 
thereby meeting Costa Rica's condition to cease a boycott of 
C d · 101 Th d G d onta ora meet1ngs. e Conta ora roup announce 
March 16, 1~85, in a joint communique with the the five 
Central American foreign ministers, that joint negotiations 
would resume April 11-12, 1985, in Panama. The joint 
communique said that: 
... there were now 'propitious conditions' for 
a resumption and stressed that the Central 
Amer1can countries had pledged their ~political 
will to ~&~e genuine momentum' to the peace 
effort. 
The foreign ministers met in May, but little was 
accomplished. Members of the Contadora Group are not 
optimistic about prospects for a Contadora treaty without 
103 U.S. support. Privately, each of the Contadora Group's 
participating foreign ministers have said that they believe 
that without the commitment ot the United States, all 




Through bilateral and collective negotiations with the 
five Central American states, the Contadora Group has 
produced a draft peace treaty for the region. The Group's 
efforts have the support of the international community, 
with endorsements from the European Economic Community, the 
Organization of American States, and the United Nations. 
The U.S. has stated support for the Contadora process, but 
its actions reveal its real opposition to the success of the 
Contadora Group's mediating efforts. 
The Contadora Group has brought the opposing Central 
American countries to the negotiating table. Tensions 
between Nicaragua and Honduras have lessened so that the 
foreign ministers of the two countries can now speak 
directly to one another. This was not the case when joint 
meetings began in 1983. Structures have been established to 
ease border tensions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. 
However, when the Contadora Group appeared on the 
verge of major compromises, U.S. allies changed their 
positions such that negotiations always sufferred a set 
back. Original demands of the U.S. and its allies in the 
region centered around calls for Nicaragua to stop its 
"export" of revolution to its neighbors. When Nicaragua 
showed signs of accepting this demand, the U.S. and its 
102 
Central American alllies demanded changes in the internal 
politics of Nicaragua. These included a call for pluralism, 
representative democracy, and a return to a free press. A 
National Security Council document provides evidence that 
the U.S. deliberately sabotaged the acceptance of the draft 
Contadora treaty in the autumn of 1984. U.S. diplomats 
pressured Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador into 
dropping their support for the draft treaty, and presenting 
their own counterdraft. This brought the negotiations to a 
standstill until January 1985, when the same three countries 
used a diplomatic incident between Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
as reason to boycott Contadora meetings. 
The diplomatic impasse was solved, and the Central 
American foreign ministers again met with the Contadora 
Group in May, but there is little hope of reaching agreement 
on a regional peace treaty. The U.S. still retains enough 
of the power in the hemisphere that without its support, and 
its active oppositon, such efforts for regional policies on 
the part of even middle powers like Mexico will not succeed. 
Nonetheless, as noted in Chapter Two, the Contadora Group 
has perhaps contributed to conditions that have prevented a 
regional war from breaking out yet. The Contadora members 
have also been successful in their pursuit of increased 
prestige, for they have attracted the support of the 
international community of nations. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that U.S. power has waned in 
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the western hemisphere and that the international system has 
moved toward polycentrism, is both supported and not 
supported. U.S. power has waned insofar as the Contadora 
Group formed at all to challenge U.S. policy in Central 
America. Twenty-five years ago, this kind of policy option 
was not available to Latin American foreign policymakers. 
The international system is therefore more flexible than it 
was then, when it seemed to better fit Kaplan's model of 
loose bipolarity. The Western bloc is decentralized, or 
polycentric, to the point that Latin American states within 
the U.S. shpere of influence, can formulate policies which 
are pursued in the individual Latin American country's 
national interest. 
Yet, the system still retains features of bipolarity, 
as discussed in the first chapter. Regional foreign policy 
initiatives on the part of Latin American states which fly 
in the face of U.S. policy cannot succeed, based on this 
case study of the Contadora Group. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has examined the Contadora Group as a 
possible manifestation of a transition from a loose bipolar 
to a polycentric international system. The foreign policies 
of the Contadora states have been examined in an effort to 
determine possible motivations for the pursuit of these 
foreign policies. These motivations were then assessed for 
their role in determining participation in the international 
system because, as discussed in Chapter One, the 
international environment sets limits on the types of 
policies which are available to policymakers in any given 
country, thereby acting as an external foreign policy 
determinant. 
In analyzing the role of the Contadora Group, Chapter 
Three discussed the Contadora peace process. This 
illustrated the efforts of the Contadora foreign ministers 
to mediate peace negotiations in Central America, and the 
difficulties they have encountered. This chapter will 
summarize the basic conclusions of the thesis. The 
fundamental questions addressed are: Does this case study 
support the contention that U.S. power is declining in the 
western hemisphere?, and to what extent are the foreign 
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policies of the Contadora Group member countries independent 
of U.S. influence? 
·Effect of Change in the 
International System 
As discussed in Chapter One, the world is still 
dominated by superpower rivalry, however, the international 
system operates such that there is greater flexibility in 
international relations than exists in a loose bipolar 
model, such as existed immediately following World War II. 
While the international system is in transition some states 
may find available to them policies which were previously 
unavailable. Latin American states have more latitude in 
the range of foreign policy options than they did even 
twenty years ago. With the waning of U.S. power in Latin 
America, nations still dominated by the U.S. have chosen 
goals from their hierarchy of foreign policy objectives 
which express more depth and range than seen previously in 
the hemisphere. 
In reference to the issue of polycentrism, the 
Contadora Group has exercised a degree of power not 
available to members of a bloc in a loose bipolar system. 
The simple fact of publicly calling U.S. policy into 
question demonstrates that the U.S. cannot dictate foreign 
policy throughout the hemisphere. The Contadora Group has 
achieved a measure of success. Thus far, an open regional 
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war has not broken out, but this mush be weighed against the 
continuing CIA-coordinated contra war. The Contadora Group 
has not been able to secure a relaxation of U.S. military 
activity in the region. Contadora peace initiatives have 
been blocked numerous times by the U.S., as discussed in 
Chapter Three. The United States still retains hegemony in 
the hemisphere such that a workable Central American peace 
treaty is not possible without the United States' backing. 
In terms of achieving national foreign policy 
interests, the Contadora process serves two functions. It 
has enhanced the prestige of Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, 
and Mexico in the global community. The Contadora Group has 
mustered world public opinion against the Reagan 
administrations' Central American policies; the European 
Economic community and the United Nations General Assembly 
has openly criticized U.S. support for the anti-Sandinista 
rebels, and both these international forums, and others, 
have endorsed the Contadora process. The United States has, 
and is, pursuing a globally unpopular policy in Central 
America. 
The real foreign policy capabilities of the four 
Contadora nations have also improved of themselves. For 
example, in the 1970's, oil revenues afforded Venezuela and 
Mexico foreign policy choices, such as development loans and 
grants to Central American and Caribbean states, which were 
traditionally in the realm of the "developed" nations. 
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Foreign Policy Determinants 
In an effort to secure a more autonomous and 
prestigious image in the world community, the Contadora 
members have asserted themselves independently of the U.S. 
foreign policy line. Each of the four has a varying history 
of such activity, and each has limited its words and actions 
in an effort not to ingratiate itself to the United States; 
reality of continued dependence on the U.S. demands each 
country not go too far. 
The motivation for an autonomous foreign policy has 
combined with a perspective on social injustice and 
revolution different from the United States', except, 
perhaps, in the case of Panama or Venezuela. This seems to 
be particularly dependent on the views of the incumbent 
president in all the Contadora countries, except in Mexico 
where a consistent world view seems to prevail. Panama's 
military and economic ties to the U.S. have been 
strengthened during the presidency of Ardito Barletta. 
Venezuela fears Cuban revolutionary activity, and Venezuelan 
leaders have expressed suspicion of the Sandinistas and 
Cubans. Venezuela continues to covertly train Salvadoran 
troops despite its public calls for peace. Colombia's 
President Betancur followed Turbay Alaya in office, and 
rejected Turbay's Cold War analysis of Central America. 
None of the Contadora four desires a confrontation of 
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the two superpowers in Central America. Through positive 
contact with the revolutionaries in Central America, both 
Mexico's President de la Madrid and Venezuela's President 
Herrera Campins have explained their belief that they may 
best influence the outcome of these conflicts. Mexico also 
allegedly face pressure from the left wing of the ruling 
party to support revolution abroad or face a challenge to 
conservative domestic policy. Some ascribe Mexico's policy 
in Central America to this factor alone, but this 
explanation seems to simplistic. The ideals of the Mexican 
Revolution have become part of the social and political 
consciousness of Mexicans. A combination of the two seems 
most plausible. 
Each of the Contadora members' presidents has stated a 
desire to see an improvement in the standard of living for 
the Central American masses, and to see their inclusion in 
the political processes of their respective countries. 
These goals, if only partially met, would prevent a large 
measure of instability which Contadora leaders fear could 
spread to their countries (see Chapter Two). 
The Contadora Group member states share a combination 
of foreign policy motivations. Perhaps the most common is 
the desire to avoid a war in Central America which would, in 
all likelihood, involve the United States. The collective 
memory of the Contadora countries winces at past U.S. 
military interventions in the hemisphere. All four 
116 
Contadora members do not wish to see a resurgence of 
military activity within their sphere of influence. 
Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia share aspirations to 
regional leadership which have surfaced since a cessation of 
direct U.S. interventions in Central America. A U.S. 
intervention in Central America would be perceived as a 
precedent for possible U.S. interventions in Mexico and 
Panama to secure oilfields and the neutrality of the Canal 
Zone, respectively. These nations have opposed U.S. policy 
in Central America because their own sovereignties, or 
status within the international system, are threatened when 
the U.S. violates the principle of non-intervention. These 
scenarios would not heighten Mexico's nor Panama's prestige. 
In fact, none of the Contadora Group nations would find its 
image enhanced by a U.S. military intervention in Central 
America, as U.S. hedgemony would inevitably outshine them. 
A war in Central America would impact negatively on the 
pursuit of the national objectives of self-enhancement, 
whether prestige or increased power is the foreign policy 
goal. War would disrupt trade in the region which Mexico 
and Venezuela have sought as a market for oil exports, and 
which Colombia has pursued as a market for its 
nontraditional exports. Not only would a Central American 
war threaten to destabilize Contadora countries' trade in 
the region, but, perhaps most importantly, could also 
threaten the stability of the Contadora countries' political 
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systems. Panama's military government fears a challenge 
from below, which could conceiveably occur should the U.S. 
intervene in the Canal Zone. Colombia's own domestic 
problems with communist guerrillas might grow if the region 
is 'contaminated' by another U.S. intervention. Mexico 
fears an influx of even more Central American refugees, and 
the prospect of beefing up its military with a treasury 
which is already short on funds during a time of economic 
austerity. 
Participation in the Contadora Group has enhanced the 
prestige of each of its members in the eyes of both the U.S. 
and the rest of the world. This has been satisfying in 
itself, particularly to Mexico, which has zealously sought 
to command more respect from the United States. Colombia's 
leadership, also ignored by the United States in the recent 
past, also regained some of its lost pride. All four 
countries have sought to improve their position vis-a-vis 
the United States. Even if the Contadora Group does not 
produce a viable peace treaty for Central America, its 
members' ultimate goals of peace, enhanced power and 
prestige will have been achieved. However, such a treaty 
has little chance without U.S. support, as demonstrated in 
the autumn of 1984. 
Further study of the regional foreign policies of Latin 
American states would be very helpful in both the fields of 
international relations and comparative politics. Regional 
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policies of Latin American states of "middle- range" power 
could illustrate how far an ally of the U.S. may assert 
itself independently of the U.S., and where, and when, those 
Latin American states are willing and able to do so. This, 
in turn, could help flesh out the literature on the general 
nature of the current, yet evolving, international system, 
which, apparently, lies somewhere between bipolarity and 
multipolarity. 
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APPENDIX 
THE DOCUMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
1) Promote a detente and terminate situations of 
conflict in the area, avoiding any action that undermines 
political confidence or tens to block the objective of 
achieving peace, security and stability in the region. 
2) Assure the strict observance of international law. 
3) Respect and guarantee human, political, social, 
economic, religious, and cultural rights. 
4) Adopt measures leading to the establishment or 
improvement of democratic, representative, and pluralistic 
systems guaranteeing popular participation in 
decision-making and assuring free access of diverse currents 
of opinion at the polls, which should be honest and 
periodic, based on the complete observance of civil rights. 
5) Promote action of national reconciliation in cases 
where there are deep divisions in society through the 
democratic political process. 
6) Create political conditions aimed at guaranteeing 
the international security, integrity, and sovereignty of 
the states in the region. 
7) Halt the arms race in all of its manifestations and 
initiate negotiations on the control and reduction of the 
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present weapons inventory as well as the number of 
soldiers. 
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8) Prohibit the installation of foreign military bases 
or any other outside military influence. 
9) Reach accords to reduce and eventually eliminate 
the presence of foreign military advisors and other outside 
elements participating in military or security activities. 
10) Establish internal control mechanisms to halt arms 
traffic from the territory of one country to another. 
11) Eliminate all arms traffic, whether intraregional 
or from outside Central America, destined for persons, 
organizations, or groups attempting to destabilize the 
governments of the region. 
12) Prevent use of national territory by persons, 
gourps, or organizations trying to destablize the 
governments of Central America. 
13) Abstain from fomenting or supporting acts of 
terrorism, subversion or sabotage in the countries of the 
area. 
14) Build mechanisms and coordinate direct 
communications systems in order to prevent, or resolve, 
incidents between the various states of the region. 
15) Continue humanitarian aid to help Central American 
refugees desplaced from their countries of origin and 
creating conditions leading to the voluntary repatriation of 
those refugees in cooperation with the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees or other relevant international 
organizations. 
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16) Fomen~ programs of economic and social development 
in order to improve living standards and assure a fair 
distribution of the wealth. 
17) Revitalize and normalize the mechanisms of 
economic integration to achieve sustained development for 
the common good of all the nations of the area. 
18) Request external monetary resources that will 
permit the reactivation of intraregional trade, overcome the 
balance of payments problem, produce funds for working 
capital, support programs to broaden and restructure the 
productive systems, and foment medium and long range 
investment programs. 
19) Request greater access to international markets in 
order to expand trade between the Central American states 
and the outside world, particularly the industrial 
countries, through a revision in commercial practices, the 
elimination of tariff barriers, and the assurance of 'fair, 
remunerative prices.' 
20) Obtain technical cooperation for the planning and 
execution of a wide spread of investment and commercial 
promotion. 
21) The foreign ministers of Central America, together 
with those of the Contadora Group, will meet to begin 
negotiations on formal agreements guaranteeing the points 
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stated above. 
Source: "The 21 Points of Contadora" THIS WEEK IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA, v. VI, no. 48, December 12, 1983, pp. 380, 382. 
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